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AN OVERVIEW OF THE INCONSISTENCY AMONG THE CIRCUITS
CONCERNING THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST ANALYSIS
APPLIED IN AN ERISA ACTION WITH AN EMPHASIS
ON THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S ADOPTION OF THE SLIDING SCALE
ANALYSIS IN WOO v. DELUXE CORPORATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)I in 1974 to rectify specific defects that limited the effectiveness
of the then-existing private retirement system.2 In an effort to remedy
the problem areas, Congress established guidelines in ERISA, including
standards for plan design concerning vesting and standards for plan
administrators, as well as seeking to protect vested portions of certain
retirement plans from premature termination. 3 However, the primary
purpose of ERISA was to protect individual pension rights. 4 In this
spirit, Congress placed a principal focus on the enforcement effort of
potential civil litigation initiated by the Secretary of Labor and, more
importantly, plan participants and beneficiaries. 5 Thus, Congress created
ERISA to protect the rights of private individuals in benefit plans that
were not effectively realized in pre-ERISA legislation. 6
While ERISA's title seems to indicate that it governs only retirement
plans, this massive area of federal legislation broadly envelops other
employee benefits such as medical, welfare, and disability insurance
plans. 7 Due to their personal nature, denial of these types of benefits by
plan administrators has generated a great deal of ERISA litigation. 8 This
Note focuses only on the analyses developed by the courts for situations
in which a plan administrator, following the denial of plan benefits, is
found to have been operating under a conflict of interest. A conflict of
interest typically occurs when a plan administrator makes decisions
concerning benefit eligibility and also has an interest in the plan which
funds the payment of benefits. This is precisely the situation involved in
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1453 (1994)) [hereinafter ERISA].
2. See ERISA, H.R. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4640. The defects that concerned Congress related to the gaps in the law and its failure to protect
individual pension rights effectively. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641.
3. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640.
4. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639.
5. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639.
6. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4639.
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l) (1994).
8. See H.R. 93-533, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639.
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Woo v. Deluxe Corp.9 In Woo, the Eighth Circuit applied a heightened
standard of review in evaluating the plan administrator's denial of
Beverly Woo's disability benefits because the court determined that the
plan administrator, Hartford, was operating under a conflict of interest.10
The statutory language of ERISA does not set out the appropriate
standard of review for actions challenging benefit eligibility determina-
tions under § 1132(a)(1)(B).11 The United States Supreme Court in Fire-
stone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch12 finally resolved this question,
holding that the appropriate standard is de novo, unless the language of
the plan grants the administrator discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.13 However,
since the issue was not directly before it, the Court merely skimmed over
the proper analysis for conflict of interest cases. 14 Since Firestone, the
federal courts have grappled with the appropriate analysis for such situa-
tions without further guidance from the Supreme Court. The lack of
any clear direction from the Supreme Court has generated inconsistency
among the circuits, and, as a result, three tests or analyses have evolved.
These tests are: 1) the Restatement test, 15 2) the sliding scale analysis, 16
and 3) the presumptively void test.17
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the post-Firestone develop-
ment of the conflict of interest analysis by providing an overview of the
ERISA conflict of interest decisions in each circuit and the evolution of
the test it has adopted. This Note also discusses the ERISA conflict of
interest analysis in the Eighth Circuit, focusing on Woo, the recent
decision in which the court adopted the sliding scale analysis.' 8 An
9. 144F.3d 1157 (8th Cir. 1998).
10. See Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 1998). The court determined that
since the plan administrator would receive a direct financial benefit as the plan insurer, it was acting
under a conflict of interest. See id. However, not all circuits automatically find a conflict of interest
based on the mere fact that a plan administrator has some facet of financial gain following a denial of
benefits. See De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1191 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating the mere fact that
a decision saved a fully-funded plan money does not necessarily support a finding that there was a
conflict of interest).
11. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1994)).
12. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
13. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
14. See id. (holding a conflict of interest should be a factor weighed by the court in determining
if the plan administrator's decision was an abuse of discretion).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
16. See Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157 (8th Cir. 1998).
17. See Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
18. Woo, 144 F.3dat 1161.
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overview of each circuit's conflict of interest analysis demonstrates how
fragmented the circuits have become in this area.
Part II of this Note provides a historical background into the con-
gressional intent and purpose of ERISA, as well as a review of the United
States Supreme Court's only decision concerning an ERISA conflict of
interest analysis.19 Part III separates the three conflict of interest tests,
with an overview of the case law in the circuits that have adopted each
respective test. Part IV discusses the evolution of the conflict of interest
decisions in the Eighth Circuit, placing emphasis on Woo. 20 Part V con-
cludes by addressing the current division and variations in the analyses
developed by the circuits for conflict of interest situations and the effect
of the Woo decision on Eighth Circuit ERISA conflict of interest
actions.21
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST ANALYSIS
The primary function of ERISA is to protect individual rights in
employee benefit plans. 22 The legislative history indicates that Congress
relied on trust law principles in developing ERISA.23 Accordingly, the
United States Supreme Court in Firestone relied on trust law principles
when establishing the appropriate standard of review in an ERISA
action.24 The diverse conflict of interest analyses that have evolved are
the result of each circuit's individual interpretation of the Firestone deci-
sion.25 Thus, although there is an obvious lack of uniformity among the
circuits, the decisions reflect a persistent pattern of protecting individual
benefit rights.26
A. THE ERISA HISTORICAL BACKGROUND REGARDING THE PLAN
ADMINISTRATOR
Before the creation of ERISA, the assets of private pension plans
were the only large accumulation of funds that had escaped effective
federal regulation. 27 Congress determined that the existing legislation,
19. See generally Firestone, 489 U.S. at 101.
20. See generally Woo, 144 F.3d at 1157.
21. See generally id.
22. See ERISA, H.R. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess, (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4639.
23. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650.
24. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
25. See id.
26. See, e.g., Salley v. E. I., DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1992)
(stating although the court generally decides an abuse of discretion based on the information known to
the administrator at the time of its decision, an administrator can abuse its discretion by failing to obtain
necessary information).
27. See H.R. 93-533, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4641.
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which was purportedly designed to regulate pension plans and protect
plan participants and beneficiaries, had weaknesses and therefore failed
to protect individuals adequately. 28 Accordingly, Congress' primary pur-
pose underlying the passage of ERISA was to protect individual pension
rights more effectively. 29 In addition, Congress intended for ERISA to
create uniformity in decisions and establish minimum standards in
administering an ERISA plan. 30
The declared policy of ERISA is to protect interstate commerce and
the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their benefici-
aries. 31 This declaration is accomplished through standards of conduct,
obligations for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and appropriate
remedies and access to the federal courts. 32 There are three basic types
of plans: 1) the unfunded plan-in which the plan sponsor's employees
are the decision makers and benefits are paid out of the sponsor's
general assets; 2) the self-funded plan-in which the assets are held in
trust and the plan sponsor's employees are the decision makers; and 3)
the funded plan-in which the plan is funded by an insurance policy and
the insurance company is the decision maker.33 A conflict of interest is
commonly alleged concerning disputes surrounding an unfunded plan,
because the benefits are paid directly from the plan sponsor's assets.
34
ERISA places a strong emphasis on the fiduciary duties of the plan
administrator in managing the benefit plan. 35 Further, ERISA provides
remedies to plan participants and beneficiaries if a plan administrator
breaches a fiduciary duty. 36
28. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642. For a description of the specific weak-
nesses that concerned Congress, see the discussion of the three federal acts that governed private
pension plans prior to the enactment of ERISA. See infra pp. 8-10.
29. See H.R. 93-533, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639; see also Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (stating ERISA was enacted "to protect contractually
defined benefits"); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) (indicating ERISA was
enacted "to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans").
30. See H.R. 93-533, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643, 4647, 4650. Examples of mini-
mum standards include vesting, protecting the individual decision making freedom essential to pension
plans, and supporting the growth and development occurring in the private pension system. See id.,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4647.
31. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. I, § 2, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
100lb(c) (1994)).
32. See id.
33. See 6 ERISA LrrG. REP. 14, 16 (Feb. 1998).
34. See, e.g., Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105-06 (1989) (noting the
plan sponsor also acted as the plan fiduciary, and any benefits paid out of the unfunded benefit plans
came directly out of the employer's funds).
35. See H.R. 93-533, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649-51.
36. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l) (1994) (establishing civil penalties for claims when a fiduciary
has breached its fiduciary responsibilities).
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Prior to the passage of ERISA, pension plans were regulated by
three federal statutes, each of which accomplished different, but related,
purposes. 37 These three statutes were the Welfare and Pension Plans Dis-
closure Act of 1958,38 the Labor Management Relations Act,39 and the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.40 While these acts assisted in regulating
pension plans, all had weaknesses which left individuals who participated
in such plans vulnerable in vital areas. 41 Thus, Congress believed that
more effective legislation was necessary to adequately protect individual
pension rights.42
The policy of the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act was to
protect the interests of welfare and pension plan participants and benefi-
ciaries through the disclosure of information concerning the plan.4 3
This policy was accomplished through disclosure requirements, mandat-
ing that the plan administrator compile, file with the Secretary of Labor,
and, upon request, provide plan participants and beneficiaries a descrip-
tion and annual report of the plan.4 4 Congress determined that the chief
procedural weakness of this Act was that it placed the responsibility of
managing the plan on the individual employees.4 5 In addition, it con-
tained only limited disclosure requirements and wholly lacked any
substantive fiduciary standards governing plan administrators.4 6 There-
fore, the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act did not adequately
regulate and protect individual rights in pension plans.
The Labor Management Relations Act provided guidelines for the
creation and operation of pension funds administered jointly by an
employer and a union. 47 However, the Act was not intended, nor did it
establish, standards for preserving vested benefits, funding adequacy, and
protecting the investment or fiduciary principles.4 8 Finally, the Internal
Revenue Code affected pension plans by retaining in the Internal Reve-
nue Service the power to determine whether a particular pension plan
would attain "qualified status," which granted the employer tax deduc-
tions for limited contributions made to the qualified plan.4 9 The Internal
37. See H.R. 93-533, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641.
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 301, repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 851 (1974).
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1994).
40. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-404, 501-503 (1994).
41. See H.R. 93-533, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4642-43.
42. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643.
43. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642.
44. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642.
45. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642.
46. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642.
47. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642.
48. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642.
49. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642.
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Revenue Code, however, only contained safeguards for the security of
anticipated benefit rights in private plans, because its primary function
was to produce revenue and prevent evasion of tax obligations.5 0 Ac-
cordingly, neither effectively regulated private pension plans, and more
efficient federal legislation was necessary.
An area of congressional concern in the creation of ERISA was the
administration and operation of pension plans. 5l Congress expressed a
particular interest in fund transactions, the level of responsibility re-
quired of the fiduciaries, and the standards of accountability that govern
the fiduciaries in the management and disposition of pension funds.5 2
Importantly, the ERISA statutory language specifically allows a fiduciary
also to serve as an administrator to the benefit plan.53 Thus, under
ERISA, an entity is essentially allowed to wear two hats: that of a plan
sponsor (acting in its own interest) and that of a fiduciary (acting in the
interests of the plan participants).S4
A person is deemed a fiduciary within the confines of ERISA when
he or she exercises any discretionary authority or control over manage-
ment of the plan or any authority or control in managing or disposing
of its assets. 55 Further, a person is a fiduciary under ERISA if he or she
renders investment advice for a fee, has authority to do so, or possesses
discretionary authority or responsibility in administering the plan.5 6 In
sum, the Supreme Court has stated that an individual is a fiduciary to the
extent the individual "exercises any discretionary authority."5 7 A fi-
duciary has "authority to control and manage the operation and admini-
stration of the plan,"SS and he or she must provide all plan participants
with a "full and fair review" of claim denials.5 9
The ERISA section concerning fiduciary responsibilities derived
from principles that developed during the evolution of trust law. 60
However, appropriate modifications were made specially to accommo-
date employee benefit plans. 6 1 In trust law, for example, the required
50. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4642.
51. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4645.
52. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4645.
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c) (1994).
54. See id.
55. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).
56. See id.
57. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989) (emphasis added).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (1994).
60. See ERISA, H.R. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4651.
61. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4651.
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standard of care for a trustee in the administration of a trust is defined as
a duty to "exercise such skill and care as a man of ordinary prudence
would exercise in dealing with his own property." 62 These modified
principles of trust law employ a twofold duty on every fiduciary in an
ERISA plan:
to act in his relationship to the plan's fund as a prudent man in
a similar situation and under like conditions would act, and to
act consistently with the principles of administering the trust
for the exclusive purposes .. .enumerated, and in accordance
with the documents and instruments governing the fund unless
they are inconsistent with the fiduciary principles of the
section." 63
The "prudent man" standard of care in ERISA is statutorily defined as
"the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
and with like aims." 64
Congress desired to create a fiduciary standard to accomplish uni-
formity in decisions under similar ERISA situations that may otherwise
differ from state to state.65 Congress expected that courts would inter-
pret the prudent man rule and other fiduciary standards while remaining
cognizant of the purposes of ERISA.66 The desired uniformity of deci-
sions was designed to assist administrators, fiduciaries, and participants of
employee benefit plans in predicting the legality of proposed actions
without requiring research into various state laws.67 While Congress'
intent was to create uniformity in ERISA decisions, the current case law
concerning when a plan administrator is operating under a potential con-
flict of interest is anything but uniform. 68 The responsibility for the lack
of uniformity is likely due to the absence of established guidelines in
ERISA for evaluating a conflict of interest or the circuits' lack of success
in requesting the United States Supreme Court to address the problem.
B. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEw IN ERISA ACTIONS
The text of ERISA is silent as to the appropriate standard of review
in claims brought under it; however, the United States Supreme Court
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
63. H.R. 93-533, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4651.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1994).
65. See H.R. 93-533, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650.
66. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650.
67. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650.
68. See id., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650.
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resolved this question in Firestone.69 Although the Supreme Court
answered the threshold question concerning the appropriate standard of
review in Firestone, inconsistency still persists in conflict of interest
situations. 70 The courts have developed modified degrees of the abuse
of discretion standard of review for evaluating conflict of interest situa-
tions, but given the absence of any appreciable guidance, the application
of these modifications varies significantly throughout the circuits.
There are three standards of review applied in ERISA actions: 1) de
novo, 2) abuse of discretion, and 3) arbitrary and capricious. The de
novo standard of review allows the trial court to determine the issues and
rights of the parties in the action as if the suit had originally been filed in
that court. 71 The scope of the trial court's inquiry contemplates a review
of the entire record and every question that was legitimately raised on
the record. 72 Importantly, the trial court is confined to the record made
in the case presented in the claims process before the plan admini-
strator.73 Although the trial court may consider the plan administrator's
findings insofar as they may be helpful, it is not bound by the those
findings.74 In sum, under the de novo standard of review, the trial court
has the duty to reach an independent conclusion as to the findings
without being influenced by the conclusions of the plan administrator. 75
The two remaining standards, abuse of discretion and arbitrary and
capricious, are viewed by the majority of the courts as synonymous and
are generally applied interchangeably in ERISA actions. 76 Abuse of
discretion ordinarily implies more than merely an error in judgment, and
it includes perversity of will, passion, or moral delinquency. 77 It is also
69. See generally Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
70. See Bruch v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). In Bruch, the Third Circuit listed two situations in which a conflict
of interest may arise: 1) if the employer acts as the plan administrator and the plan provides that the
employer's contributions are determined by the cost of satisfying plan liabilities in the previous year;
or 2) if the plan administrator is also the employer and the plan is unfunded, such that any benefits
provided under the plan are paid directly by the employer from general corporate funds. See id. at
137-38.





76. See Cox v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 572 n.3 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that
the difference between the arbitrary and capricious standard and the abuse of discretion standard is a
distinction without a difference), aff'don appeal after remand, 13 F.3d 272 (8th Cir. 1993). But see
Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating the arbitrary and capricious standard is
appropriate when the decision is limited only by good faith, but when the plan administrator has
discretion to make reasonable constructions of the terms of the plan, the standard of review is abuse of
discretion).
77. See 1 C.J.S. Abuse, at 392 (1985).
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described as an act done or step taken outside the regular course of
proceedings or beyond the limits of discretion, or an action that is arbi-
trary and capricious. 78 Significantly, one of the essentials of the abuse
of discretion standard is that the appealed decision must plainly appear
to effect injustice. 79 A helpful description is: "if reasonable men could
differ as to the propriety of the action taken, it cannot be said that the
court abused its discretion." 80 However, abuse of discretion does not
imply a bad motive, wrongful or ulterior purpose, or willful disregard for
the rights of a litigant.81
The case that started the wheels turning toward answering the stan-
dard of review question was Bruch v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Com-
pany.82 In Bruch, the Third Circuit held that when an employer acts as
the administrator of an unfunded employee benefit plan, and as such is
the sole source of funding for the plan, its decision to deny benefits
should be subject to de novo review. 83 In reaching this conclusion, the
court reasoned that because the plan was controlled entirely by the
employer, rather than by a group evenly divided between the employer
and employees, and since every dollar provided in benefits was a dollar
spent by the employer, there was no assurance that the employer would
be impartial in its decisions. 84 Conversely, other circuits were utilizing a
more rigorous version of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review
in analogous situations. 85 In an attempt to resolve the question concern-
ing the appropriate standard for reviewing an ERISA claim filed under §
1132(a)(1)(B), 86 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 87
In Firestone, Firestone Tire ("Firestone") wore two hats, acting as
both the plan administrator and the plan fiduciary for three pension and
welfare benefit plans for its employees. 88 Firestone was the sole source
of funding for the benefit plans and did not establish separate trust funds
out of which benefits under the plan were paid. 89 Accordingly, these
78. See id. at 393.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 394 n.37.
81. See id. at 392-93.
82. 828 F.2d 134 (3rd Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
83. See Bruch v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
84. See id. at 144.
85. See id. at 139 (citing Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301,
1305 (9th Cir. 1983)).
86. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994)). Section 1132(a)(1)(B) affords a civil cause of action to a plan
participant or beneficiary to recover benefits, enforce rights, or clarify rights to future benefits due
under the terms of the plan. See id.
87. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 134, cert. granted, 485 U.S. 986 (1988).
88. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989).
89. See id.
NOTE 823
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ERISA-governed employee benefit plans were "unfunded." 90 Firestone
sold its plastics division, at which time several of its employees sought
severance benefits under the termination pay plan provided by Fire-
stone. 91 Firestone denied the employees benefits on the grounds that the
sale of the plastics division did not constitute a "reduction in force," as
required by the plan language.92 The employees followed the denial of
benefits with a class action suit, which was eventually appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.93
The Supreme Court recognized that the statutory language of
ERISA did not set forth an appropriate standard of review for claims
filed by plan participants or beneficiaries to recover benefits, enforce
rights, or clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of an ERISA
plan.94 In the absence of an express standard of review, federal courts
had previously adopted through analogy the arbitrary and capricious
standard derived from a provision of the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA), the standard applied to all plan administrators' decisions.95
Early on, the courts looked to the LMRA for direction in developing a
standard of review because the LMRA and ERISA have nearly identical
duties of loyalty to plan participants and both require that the fiduciary
act for the sole and exclusive benefit of plan participants. 96 In com-
paring the LMRA to ERISA, the Supreme Court found that a wholesale
adoption of the LMRA arbitrary and capricious standard in ERISA was
unwarranted because the LMRA did not effectively protect individual
pension rights, a primary focus of ERISA.97 Further, since the primary
distinction between the two acts is the jurisdictional basis, LMRA
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 106.
93. See id.
94. See id., at 109; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1994).
95. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109; see also Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat.
136, 157 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1994)) [hereinafter LMRA]. As
previously indicated, the LMRA was one of three federal statutes that governed pension plans prior to
the enactment of ERISA. See ERISA, H.R. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641.
96. See Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 333 (3d
Cir. 1984). The LMRA imposes a duty of loyalty on a fund representative by permitting employer
contributions to a welfare fund only if it is used for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees. See
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). Similarly, ERISA requires a fiduciary to exercise his or her duties with respect
to the plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for that exclusive purpose.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l) (1994).
97. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109. Congress did not intend to constrict the common law rights of
employees when enacting ERISA. See id. at 114. The Supreme Court stated that a blanket adoption of
the arbitrary and capricious standard would afford less protection to plan beneficiaries than they
enjoyed before ERISA was enacted. See id.
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principles did not support an adoption of the arbitrary and capricious
standard in connection with § 1132(a)(1)(B). 98
In dismissing the LMRA standards, the Supreme Court considered
the legislative history of ERISA and recognized that its language and
terminology were premised on trust law. 99 Thus, in determining the
appropriate standard of review for claims under § 1132(a)(1)(B), the
Supreme Court relied on trust law principles for guidance. 100 The
Supreme Court noted, for instance, that well-settled trust law principles
point to a de novo standard of review in analyzing benefit eligibility
determinations based on plan interpretations.101 However, when a trustee
exercises discretionary powers, trust law provides for a deferential stan-
dard of review. 102 The Supreme Court concluded, therefore, that since
ERISA abounds with trust law language and terminology, the de novo
standard of review from trust law was consistent with the pre-ERISA
judicial interpretation of employee benefit claims. 103
Accordingly, the Supreme Court established that challenges to deni-
als of benefits asserted under § 1132(a)(1)(B) are to be reviewed de
novo. 104 However, if the plan grants discretionary authority to the ad-
98. See id. at 110. The LMRA does not provide for review of decisions by a trustee. See id. at
109. Thus, the arbitrary and capricious standard was adopted not only as a standard of review, but,
more importantly, as a way of exercising jurisdiction over suits. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c); see also Van
Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating when a
plan provision under LMRA had the effect of denying a benefit application unreasonably, or as it
evolved, arbitrarily and capriciously, courts held that the plan, as structured, was not for the sole
and exclusive benefit of the employees and, therefore, the denial was a violation of 29 U.S.C. §
186(c)(5)); John A. McCreary, Jr., Comment, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Under ERISA:
Its Origins and Application, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 1033, 1037-41 (1985). Conversely, ERISA explicitly pro-
vides for a civil cause of action against a plan administrator and fiduciary to redress a decision by the
administrator for noncompliance with the benefit plan or a breach of fiduciary duty. See 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a).
99. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110.
100. See id. at 11.
101. See id. at 112.
102. See id. at I I l (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959) ("Where discretion is
conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control
by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion.")); see also GEORGE GLEASON
BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 560, at 193-208 (West rev. 2d
ed. 1980) (discussing a trustee's abuse of discretion). In addition, prior to the enactment of ERISA,
claims challenging a plan administrator's denial of benefits were governed by contract law. See
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112. Therefore, if the plan had not provided the administrator with
discretionary or final authority to construe unclear terms, the court reviewed the claim as a typical
contract claim, referring to the plan terms and the intent of the parties. See id. at 112-13. Thus, the
court reviewed acts of the plan administrators under a de novo standard. See id. However, if the plan
conferred discretionary authority to the plan administrator, the court gave deference to the
administrator's decisions. See Lowry v. Bankers Life and Cas. Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 524
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 852 (1989); see also Smith v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 246 A.2d
697, 698 (N.H. 1968) (holding the arbitrary and capricious standard was appropriate where a plan
provided the committee authority to determine conclusively all questions arising in the administration
of the plan).
103. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112.
104. See id. at 115.
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ministrator or fiduciary to construe its terms, the applicable standard of
review is the abuse of discretion standard.l05 The Supreme Court clearly
stated that it made its decision irrespective of the motives or possible
conflicts of interests of a plan administrator, and it rejected the Third Cir-
cuit's focus on the impartiality or motives of the plan administrator.106
Significantly, the Court held that if the plan provides discretion to the
administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest,
the conflict must be considered a factor in deciding whether there was an
abuse of discretion.1 07 Since the Firestone plan did not provide the plan
administrator with discretionary authority, the Supreme Court held that
de novo was the appropriate standard of review. 108
Although the Supreme Court intended to resolve the questions sur-
rounding the appropriate standard of review for claims filed under §
1 132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, it failed to provide clear direction for the lower
courts in analyzing situations in which the plan administrator is operat-
ing under a conflict of interest because that particular issue was not
directly before the Court.109 Thus, the Supreme Court left unanswered
the transition from finding that a conflict of interest exists to determin-
ing the degree of the abuse of discretion standard to be applied. 1' 0 The
courts have split in their interpretation of the Supreme Court's statement
in Firestonelll and in doing so have strayed far from the congressional
goal of uniformity in ERISA decisions.1l2
While the United States Supreme Court established the appropriate
standard of review in ERISA claims generally, several sub-issues have
arisen in the conflict of interest cases which have contributed to the con-
fusion and the lack of uniformity in ERISA decisions among the cir-
cuits. 11 3 For instance, the courts are split as to what language in the plan
is adequate to extend discretionary authority to the plan administrator 114
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d). The exact quote is: "Of
course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a
conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a 'factor in determining whether there is an abuse
of discretion."' Id.
108. See id. at 112. The termination plan in question did not grant the administrator any power to
construe certain terms or have any language that eligibility determinations are to be given deference.
See id.
109. See id. at 115. For examples of situations in which a conflict of interest would exist, see
infra p. 14 and note 69.
110. See 6 ERISA LrrG. REP. 14, 15 (Feb. 1998).
111. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
112. See ERISA, H.R. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4650.
113. See 6 ERISA LrrG. REP. at 14-15.
114. See id. at 14; see also Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 439 (3d Cir. 1997)
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and what exactly qualifies as a conflict of interest on the part of the plan
administrator.' 15 In addition, it appears that courts, in an attempt to
avoid reconciling and applying the conflict of interest analysis, strive to
avoid finding conflict, especially in cases involving self-funded plans or
where the conflict is too remote to warrant finding a conflict of in-
terest. 116  These splits facilitate the courts' contrasting analyses. Further,
in the absence of any clear guidance and through numerous individual
interpretations of the Firestone decision, the courts have developed
differing tests applicable to conflict of interest situations.1 17
III. THE TESTS
Three tests have evolved for evaluating a situation in which the plan
administrator is operating under a conflict of interest. The first is the
Restatement test, which mirrors section 187 of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts. 118 Section 187 of the Restatement lists factors and commen-
tary to assist in determining whether a trustee abused its discretion. 119
The second test is the sliding scale analysis, utilized, with some varia-
tions, by the majority of the circuits.12 0 The sliding scale analysis applies
a modified arbitrary and capricious standard. 121 However, the amount
of deference afforded the administrator's decision is lessened based on
the degree to which the interests of the administrator are adverse to the
(holding that a broad grant of discretionary authority to the administrator is sufficient to preclude de
novo review); Wildbur v. ARCO Chemical Co., 974 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
discretionary authority cannot be implied and the administrator is afforded no discretion to determine
eligibility of benefits or interpret the plan unless the plan language expressly confers that authority);
Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1050, 1060 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding
that the appropriate standard was de novo because the plan did not contain an explicit provision
granting it discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the plan).
115. See Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561-62 (1 th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). In Brown, the court held that the plan administrator had an
inherent conflict of interest since it was the insurance company that administered the policy and it
incurred a direct expense in determining benefits in favor of the plan participants. Id. Conversely, in
Chojnacki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the court adopted a quasi de minimus test in determining if the
plan administrator was acting under a conflict of interest. Chojnacki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108
F.3d 810, 815-16 (7th Cir. 1997). In so doing, the court held that even though it was an unfunded plan,
the administrator was an officer of defendant subsidiary companies and any benefits paid would come
directly from defendant's pocketbook, the defendant was not acting under a conflict of interest since
the potential benefits paid were minuscule in proportion to the net revenue of the company. See id.
116. See 6 ERISA LrrG. REP. at 16; see also Buckley v. Metropolitan Life, 115 F.3d 936, 939-40
(I lth Cir.), reh'g denied, 129 F.3d 617 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (holding no conflict of interest existed since
the defendant incurred no direct expense in paying benefits or a direct benefit in denial of claims);
Mitchell, 113 F.3d at 437 n.4 (finding no conflict of interest because although the plan was self-
funded, the defendant would incur no direct expense in paying benefits).
117. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959); see also Sullivan v. LTV
Aerospace and Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251 (2d Cir. 1996).
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d.
120. See Ellis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
121. See id. at 233.
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interests of the plan participants and beneficiaries. 122 Therefore, the
arbitrary and capricious standard is based on a "sliding scale" in
proportion to the amount of conflict at issue. 123
The third test is the presumptively void test, applied in only a few
circuits.124 Generally, the presumptively void test applies a heightened
arbitrary and capricious standard.125 However, this test is distinctive be-
cause it is based on a burden-shifting framework. 126 Once the plan bene-
ficiary demonstrates that the administrator has a conflict of interest, the
burden shifts to the administrator to show its discretionary interpretation
of the plan was not tainted by self interest. 127 Thus, the development and
application of three different tests to an ERISA conflict of interest
situation has created a diverse range of decisions.
A. THE RESTATEMENT TEST
The Restatement test mirrors section 187 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Trusts. 12 8 Importantly, under the Restatement, a conflict of
interest is only one of six factors relevant to a court in determining if the
trustee has abused its discretion. 129 While the de novo standard is
applied in evaluating ERISA claims, if the plan confers discretion on the
administrator in determining eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan, the arbitrary and capricious standard is applied.130
However, the Restatement applies the de novo standard when the plaintiff
proves that the administrator's decision was influenced by a conflict of
interest or an improper motive.131 As a result, the administrator's deci-
sion is afforded no deference.
In Firestone, Justice O'Connor quoted language from the Restate-
ment in an apparent attempt to supply direction for determining the
appropriate standard of review to be applied in an ERISA conflict of
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1156 (1 lth Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 1566.
127. See id.
128. See REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959).
129. See id. The Restatement factors for determining whether a trustee abused its discretion are:
1) the extent of the discretion conferred on the trustee by the terms of the trust, 2) the purposes of the
trust, 3) the nature of the power, 4) the existence or non-existence, definiteness or indefiniteness of an
external standard that the reasonableness of the trustee's conduct is judged, 5) the motives of the
trustee in exercising or refraining from exercising the power, and 6) the existence or nonexistence of
a conflicting interest in the trustee conflicting to that of the beneficiaries. See id.
130. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
131. See Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace and Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1256 (2d Cir. 1996).
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interest situation. 132 The critical language of this comment is that a
"conflict must be weighed as 'a factor[] in determining whether there is
an abuse of discretion."' 133 While instructive, this comment is mislead-
ing regarding the actual function of section 187 of the Restatement
because it tends to lead the reader to believe that the Restatement utilizes
a weighing test, such that a conflict of interest alone is not dispositive.134
It also implies that there is a weighing impact for determining the abuse
of discretion, irrespective of whether the administrator was influenced by
the conflict. 135 However, this is not the case under the Restatement.
In fact, the language of the Restatement indicates that determining
whether a conflict of interest exists is directly related to a finding that the
trustee is acting under an improper motive. 136 If the trustee is deemed to
have acted with an improper motive, the abuse of discretion standard
drops away and the decision is reviewed under the de novo standard of
review. 137
Although it does not use the phrase, the Second Circuit is the only
circuit that has adopted a test mirroring section 187 of the Restate-
ment. 138 The Second Circuit has viewed the above-quoted language
from Firestone as suggesting that an intermediate standard of review is
applied to ERISA conflict of interest situations. 139 In Sullivan v. LTV
Aerospace and Defense Co. 140 the court held that the test for determin-
ing whether the administrator's interpretation of the plan is arbitrary and
capricious is twofold.14 1
132. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
133. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d); see also 6 ERISA Lrrm. REP.
14, 17 (Feb. 1998).
134. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d.
135. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d.
136. See id. at cmt. g; see also 6 ERISA LrrG. REP. 14, 16 (Feb. 1998).
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTS § 187 cmt. g. Instructively, this comment states that
the court will control the exercise of power by a trustee where he or she acts from an improper
motive, even though he or she is not dishonest, when that motive furthers a purpose other than that of
the trust. See id. By "control," the writers of the Restatement indicate that the court will "interpose."
See id. The term "interpose" has been interpreted to mean that if the decisionmaker is acting from an
improper motive, the court will no longer pay attention to the decisionmaker's findings and will instead
apply a de novo standard of review. See 6 ERISA Lrro. REP. at 16.
138. See Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace and Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (2d Cir. 1996). In
establishing the two-step analysis, the court in Sullivan relied on the analysis in Pagan v. Nynex Pen-
sion Plan, which held that a decision was not arbitrary and capricious because the plaintiff failed to
establish how the conflict affected the reasonableness of the decision. Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1255 (citing
Pagan v. Nynex Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 1995)). Further, the Sullivan court applied the
standard of Firestone, which held that a conflict of interest is a factor to be weighed by the court in
determining whether the administrator's decision was an abuse of discretion. Sullivan, 82 F.3d at
1255; see also Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
139. See Elsroth v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 427, 434
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115).
140. 82 F.3d 1251 (2d Cir. 1996).
141. See Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace and Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255 (2d Cir. 1996).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:815
The court must first inquire whether the decision by the administra-
tor was reasonable in light of possible competing interpretations of the
plan.142 For example, certain terms of the plan could be interpreted with
different meanings, thereby affecting the plan participant or beneficia-
ries' benefit eligibility with a resulting financial benefit to the admini-
strator. 143 Thus, the court must decide, while considering alternative
interpretations, whether the administrator's final decision was reasona-
ble. 144 Second, the court must consider whether the evidence shows that
the administrator was actually influenced by the conflict.145 If the court
determines that the administrator was, in fact, influenced by the conflict
of interest, the normal deference accorded the administrator's decision
drops away, and the court interprets the plan under the de novo standard
of review. 146
In the Second Circuit, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that a conflict of interest affected the
plan administrator's decision.147 However, the administrator carries the
burden of establishing that the plan confers on him or her discretionary
authority for decisions concerning benefits.' 48 When applying the arbi-
trary and capricious standard, the court may overturn a decision to deny
142. See id. In Pagan, the court held "[wihere it is necessary for a reviewing court to choose
between two competing yet reasonable interpretations of a pension plan, this Court must accept that
offered by the administrators." Pagan, 52 F.3d at 443 (citing Jordan v. Retirement Comm. of
Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 46 F.3d 1264, 1273 (2d Cir. 1995)). However, the plaintiff in Pagan
argued for enforcement of the doctrine of contra proferentum. See id. This doctrine advances the
premise that when one party is responsible for drafting an instrument, in the absence of evidence
indicating the intent of the parties, any ambiguity is resolved against the drafter. See id. (citing O'Neil
v. Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees of RKO Gen., Inc., 37 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 1994)).
However, the Pagan court noted that the doctrine of contra proferentum would be applicable only
when the court reviews an ERISA plan de novo. See id.
143. See Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1256.
144. See id. The court also noted that the administrator's interpretation cannot be deemed arbi-
trary and capricious simply because the plaintiffs offered a plausible alternative interpretation. See id.
145. See id. at 1255-56; see also Pagan, 52 F.3d at 443 (holding that a reasonable interpretation
of the plan will stand unless the participants can show that the alleged "conflict affected the
reasonableness of the Committee's decision").
146. See Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1256.
147. See id. at 1259. But see Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1157,
1566-67 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991) (holding when a plan beneficiary
establishes a conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove
its interpretation of the plan was not tainted by self-interest). In Sullivan, the court rejected the
burden-shifting concept from Brown, indicating that it "nullifies the deference traditionally afforded to
plan administrators under the arbitrary and capricious standard." Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1259; Brown,
898 F.2d at 566-67.
148. See Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1050, 1059 (E.D.N.Y.
1993). Further, the court in Scalamandre held that any ambiguities in determining if the plan admini-
strator is conferred discretionary authority in the plan is construed in favor of the party seeking




benefits only if it was "without reason, unsupported by substantial
evidence or erroneous as a matter of law."149 In making this determina-
tion, the court must limit its scope of review to the record before the
administrator when its decision was made. 150 Conversely, under the de
novo standard of review, the court has discretion to admit additional
evidence, but it must not do so in the absence of good cause. 151
Thus, where the terms of the plan grant the administrator discretion-
ary authority, the arbitrary and capricious standard applies, and the
Restatement test places a positive duty on the plaintiff to establish that
the plan administrator was actually influenced by an alleged conflict of
interest when making its decision regarding benefit eligibility.152 Once
the plaintiff has established the conflict of interest by a preponderance
of the evidence, the court interprets the plan de novo and the arbitrary
and capricious standard no long applies.153 This test appears to be a way
to determine fairly what is actually a conflict of interest, because the
plaintiff must present evidence that there is a conflict and that the
conflict affected the administrator's benefit eligibility decision.154 The
parties are thereby afforded an opportunity to explain the circumstances
surrounding the decision rather than being presumed to have an inherent
conflict of interest merely by virtue of their position or status. 15 5
149. Pagan, 52 F.3d at 438 (citing Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Rouche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir.
1993)); see also Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974)
("[a] reviewing court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment").
150. See Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066 (2d Cir. 1995) (following the majority of
circuits in concluding that the reviewing court is limited to the administrative record under the
arbitrary and capricious standard); Durr v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 15 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D. Conn.
1998) (noting that under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the reviewing court is limited in its
scope of review to the administrative record before the administrator when its decision was made).
151. See DeFelice v. American Inter'l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y. 112 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir.
1997) (expanding Masella v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 103-05 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding additional evidence may be considered upon de novo review of an issue of plan
interpretation)). In DeFelice, the court held that when the court reviews an administrative decision
under a plan that does not grant discretion, the review is de novo and limited to the record in front of
the claims administrator unless the court finds good cause to consider additional evidence. See id. at
66-67. An established conflict of interest is considered good cause warranting admission of additional
evidence. See id. at 67. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiff does not have to establish the
second element of the Restatement test, that the conflict caused actual prejudice, in order for the court
to find the conflict to be good cause. See id. But see Perry v. Simplicity Engineering a Div. of Lukens
Gen. Indus., Inc., 900 F.2d 963, 966-67 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding no additional evidence is admissible
beyond the administrative record because the court should not become a substitute for plan
administrators).
152. See Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1259.
153. See id. at 1256.
154. See id. at 1256-57. In Sullivan, the plaintiff established sufficient evidence that the plan ad-
ministrative committee were employees of the employer and thus owed a fiduciary duty to the employ-
er. See id. at 1256. Further, the plan was unfunded, meaning all benefits paid would be a direct
company expense. See id. The financial status of the company at the time of plaintiffs claim was
poor and the committee members were aware of this when they made eligibility decisions. See id.
155. See id. at 1255. In Sullivan, the court noted that finding an inherent conflict existed between
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However, the majority of the circuits have adopted the sliding scale
analysis when addressing such situations. 156
B. THE SLIDING SCALE ANALYSIS
The sliding scale analysis utilizes the arbitrary and capricious
standard when the plan language grants the administrator discretionary
authority to determine claim eligibility or to construe the terms of the
plan.157 However, the normal amount of deference afforded the admin-
istrator's decision is tempered on a sliding scale according to the degree
of conflict under which the administrator is determined to be laboring at
the time of its decision.15 8 A plan administrator has a duty to act solely
in the interest of the plan participants and beneficiaries; thus, under the
sliding scale analysis, if a court determines that the administrator may be
acting for other purposes, such as self-interest, then the degree of defer-
ence applied to its decision is lessened. 159 There are some circuits that
have developed and follow a more generally accepted sliding scaling
analysis, while other circuits have modified the test and adopted a hybrid
of the sliding scale analysis. Accordingly, there is a lack of uniformity
even among the circuits that are purportedly applying the same test.
1. The Traditional Sliding Scale Analysis
The traditional sliding scale analysis has been adopted by the
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. Although these circuits are
theoretically utilizing the same test to analyze ERISA conflict of interest
cases, each circuit has customized its analysis. Therefore, each circuit is
discussed individually.
a. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has developed a more "traditional" sliding scale
analysis, modifying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 160
In the Fourth Circuit, a court must initially determine de novo, whether
the fiduciary role and the profit-making objective of an insurance company makes a highly deferential
standard of review inappropriate. See id.
156. See, e.g., Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that
when a plan administrator acts under a conflict of interest, the arbitrary and capricious standard is
applied with "more bite," emphasizing reasonableness); Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Serv., 3
F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating when a decision by a fiduciary exercising discretion will further the
financial interests of the fiduciary, the court will not act as deferentially as would otherwise be
appropriate).
157. See Ellis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 232 (4th Cir. 1997).
158. See id.
159. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994).
160. See Ellis, 126 F.3d at 233.
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the terms of the plan prescribe the benefit or whether the plan confers on
the administrator discretionary authority to make a determination of the
benefit.161 If the plan confers discretion, the court must determine, again
de novo, whether the administrator acted within the scope of its discre-
tion in making its decision. 162 Finally, if the administrator acted within
the scope of discretion, the court will review the merits of the decision
for an abuse of discretion.163
The appropriate standard of review is thus determined by the
language of the plan.164 If the plan language grants the administrator
discretionary authority, then the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review is applied.165 The Fourth Circuit requires no magic words in the
plan; rather, the grant of discretionary authority need only appear on the
face of the plan documents and must afford the administrator the power
to construe disputed terms or resolve disagreements over benefit eligi-
bility. 166 Conversely, if the plan does not grant the plan administrator
discretionary authority, the appropriate standard of review is de novo. 167
If the plan administrator is operating under a conflict of interest, that
conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining whether the plan
administrator abused its discretion.168 The conflict of interest analysis is
applied on a case-by-case basis to lessen the deference normally afford-
ed the administrator's decision under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard, but only to the extent necessary to counteract any influence
resulting from the conflict. 169
161. See Haley v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 84, 89 (4th Cir. 1996).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164, See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); see also De Nobel
v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1187 (4th Cit. 1989).
165. See Ellis, 126 F.3d at 232 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115).
166. See De Nobel, 885 F.2d at 1187. In De Nobel, the plaintiff argued that since nowhere in the
plan was the administrator expressly granted "discretionary authority" by the presence of the word
"discretion," the de novo standard should be applied. Id. at 1186-87. The court, however, refused to
engage in "semantic hairsplitting" and found that the broad language of the plan conferring discretion
was sufficient to trigger the arbitrary and capricious standard. See id.
167. See Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating as a general
matter ERISA plans are subject to de novo review).
168. See Ellis, 126 F.3d at 233 (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115). The mere fact that a deci-
sion saved a fully-funded plan money does not necessarily support a finding that there was a conflict
of interest. See De Nobel, 885 F.2d at 1191.
169. See Ellis, 126 F.3d at 233 (quoting Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Serv., 3 F.3d 80, 87
(4th Cir. 1993)); see also Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152. In Bedrick, the court stated that when a fiduciary
exercises discretion in interpreting a disputed term of a plan and one interpretation will further the
financial interests of the fiduciary, the court will not act as deferentially as would otherwise be
appropriate. Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152 (quoting Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 67 F.3d 53,
56 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996)). In these instances, the deference will be
lessened to the degree necessary to neutralize any influence resulting from the conflict. See id.
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Thus, even though the court will not, under any circumstances,
deviate from the abuse of discretion standard, the court will modify the
standard according to a sliding scale. 170 Under this deferential standard,
the court will not disturb the administrator's decision if it is reasonable,
even though the court would have reached a different conclusion. 171
The decision is reasonable if it is "the result of a deliberate, principled
reasoning process and if it is supported by substantial evidence." 172
Further, under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the scope of the
court's review is limited to the record before the administrator. 173 How-
ever, if the court is reviewing the administrator's decision under the de
novo standard, the scope of review permits the court, in its discretion, to
allow additional evidence not before the plan administrator at the time of
its decision.174
In determining whether a plan administrator abused its discretion,
the Fourth Circuit in Haley v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Company175
adopted a modified version of the six factors enlisted in the Restate-
ment. 176 These factors are: 1) the scope of the discretion conferred; 2)
the purpose of the plan provision granting discretion; 3) any external
standard relevant in exercising discretion; 4) the administrator's motives;
and 5) any conflict of interest that the administrator operates under when
making decisions.177 These factors are applied selectively to the extent
each is relevant to the specific situation before the court.178
Further, in order to escape a finding of a conflict of interest, a
fiduciary must act as though he or she is free of the interests that conflict
170. See Ellis, 126 F.3d at 233. The more incentive exhibited by the administrator for self-bene-
fit by a certain interpretation for benefit eligibility, the more objectively reasonable the decision must
be and the more substantial the evidence must be to support it. See id.
171. See id. (citing Doe, 3 F.3d at 85); see also RESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. e
(1959) ("[t]he mere fact that if the discretion had been conferred upon the court, the court would
have exercised the power differently, is not a sufficient reason for interfering with the exercise of the
power by the trustee").
172. Ellis, 126 F.3d at 232 (citing Brogan v. Holland, 105 F.3d 158, 161 (4th Cir. 1997)).
173. See Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding the court
improperly admitted additional evidence that was not before the plan administrator when reviewing
the decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard).
174. See Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1025 (4th Cir. 1993). Important-
ly, the Quesinberry court indicated that the reviewing court should exercise its discretion and only
allow additional evidence when the circumstances indicate that such evidence is necessary to conduct
an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision. See id If additional evidence is not necessary
for an adequate review, the court should only look to the evidence before the administrator at the time
of the determination. See id.
175. 77 F.3d 84, 89 (1996)
176. See Haley v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 84, 89 (1996); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d.




with the beneficiaries. 179 While ERISA does tolerate a conflict of interest
when the plan administrator is also the plan insurer, the conflict present
by the virtue of this relationship must not infect the fiduciary's duty to
act solely in the interest of the plan participants and beneficiaries and for
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits and administering the
plan.180 Accordingly, the fiduciary must act with undivided loyalty to
the plan participants in a manner consistent with that mandated duty.181
In summary, if the plan administrator is granted discretionary
authority to determine eligibility or construe the terms of the plan, the
applicable standard of review is abuse of discretion. 182 However, if the
plan administrator is found to be operating under a conflict of interest,
the abuse of discretion standard is modified on a sliding scale according
to the degree the administrator's interest conflicts with the interests of
the plan participants and beneficiaries. 183
b. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has described the arbitrary and capricious standard
as a "range" rather than a point, which in effect creates a sliding scale
of judicial review of a trustee's decision.184 In adopting the sliding scale
analysis, the Fifth Circuit recognized that an alleged conflict of interest
does not change the standard of review. 185 While discretionary authority
cannot be implied, but must be expressly conferred in the plan language,
the Fifth Circuit does not require the word "discretion" actually to
179. See Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Serv., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993). Doe elabo-
rates on a fiduciary's conflict of interest by stating that "[e]ven the most careful and sensitive fiduci-
ary in those circumstances may unconsciously favor its profit interest over the interests of the plan,
leaving beneficiaries less protected than when the trustee acts without self-interest and solely for the
benefit of the plan." Id. at 86-87.
180. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1994); see also Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149,
154 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating ERISA demands undivided loyalty by the fiduciary to the plan participants
and there is no balancing of interests); Pappas v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 20 F. Supp. 2d 923,
929 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that when the plan fiduciary is also the plan insurer, this conflict must not
infect the fiduciary duty imposed under ERISA).
181. See Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 154.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Lowry v. Bankers Life and Cas. Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 525 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 852 (1989) (citing Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d
1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987)). In Van Boxel, the court provided guidance in the use of the sliding scale
analysis, stating that the "more penetrating the greater is the suspicion of partiality, less penetrating the
smaller that suspicion is." 836 F.2d at 1052-53. In addition, the abuse of discretion and arbitrary and
capricious standards are used interchangeably in the Fifth Circuit. See Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co.,
974 F.2d 631, 635 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992). The difference between the standards is seen as one of
semantics rather than substance. See id.
185. See Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1992). The
court quoted Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch for the premise that a conflict of interest must be
weighed as a factor in determining whether there was an abuse of discretion. Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
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appear in the document. 186 Rather, the courts are directed to focus on
the breadth of the administrator's power and his or her ability to deter-
mine benefit eligibility or to construe the terms of the plan. 187 Thus, if
the plan language does not expressly confer discretionary authority to
the plan administrator, the de novo standard of review is applied in re-
viewing the administrator's denial of benefits. 188 Alternatively, if discre-
tion is expressly granted to a plan administrator, the decision is reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard. 189 If, however, the administrator
is determined to be operating under a conflict of interest, then the
standard of review is modified to a sliding scale abuse of discretion
standard. 190
In the Fifth Circuit, application of the abuse of discretion standard
involves a two-step analysis.191 First, a decision must be made concern-
ing the proper legal interpretation of the plan.1 92 In reaching this
decision, the court must consider: 1) whether the administrator gave the
plan uniform construction; 2) whether the interpretation is consistent
with a fair reading of the plan; and 3) any unanticipated costs resulting
from different interpretations of the plan.193 Second, if the administrator
did not construe the plan according to the plan's legal interpretation, the
court must determine whether the administrator's decision was an abuse
of discretion. 194  There are three important factors in this step of the
analysis: "1) the internal consistency of the plan under the administra-
tors' interpretation; 2) any relevant regulations formulated by the
appropriate administrative agencies; and 3) the factual background of
the determination and any inferences of lack of good faith."195
Although an incorrect interpretation of the plan by the administra-
tor does not alone establish an abuse of discretion, there is a strong indi-
cation that the administrator's action was arbitrary and capricious if the
decision is in direct conflict with the express plan language.196 Follow-
186. See Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 636-37.
187. See id. at 637 (quoting Block v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 952 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
188. See id. at 636 (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115).
189. See Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 597-98 (5th Cir. 1994).
190. See Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 638 (instructing courts to evaluate inferences of a lack of good
faith on the part of the administrator on a sliding scale).
191. See Jordan v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 900 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
939 (1990). This multi-step analysis originated in Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc. Dennard v.
Richards Group, Inc. 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982).
192. See Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 637.
193. See Jordan, 900 F.2d at 56.
194. See Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 637.
195. See id. at 638; see also Batchelor v. International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers Local 861
Pension and Retirement Fund, 877 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314).
196. See id. at 445 (quoting Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314).
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ing the Supreme Court's holding in Firestone, any potential conflict of
interest must be weighed as a factor in determining whether the plan
administrator abused its discretion.197 Therefore, the presence of a con-
flict of interest triggers the sliding scale abuse of discretion standard.198
Generally, the court will rely only on the information before an
administrator at the time of its decision in determining whether that
decision was arbitrary and capricious.199 The Fifth Circuit has recog-
nized that an administrator can abuse its discretion by failing to obtain
the information necessary to make a reasonable decision. 200 The Fifth
Circuit also allows a trial court to consider evidence outside the adminis-
trative record in determining whether the plan administrator abused its
discretion in making a benefit determination. 201
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit utilizes a "traditional" sliding scale
analysis when reviewing the decision of a plan administrator who is
afforded discretionary authority under the plan and is operating under a
conflict of interest. 202 A two-step process has been adopted, with several
distinct factors to assist the courts in determining whether the administra-
tor's decision was, in fact, an abuse of its discretion.203 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit is unique in that it allows the court to review additional informa-
tion not before the plan administrator at the time of its decision. 204
c. Seventh Circuit
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit adopted the sliding scale analysis
in a conflict of interest situation even prior to the Supreme Court's
197. See Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 1994). In Sweat-
man, the court held that the administrator did not abuse its discretion by choosing to use the indepen-
dent medical consultant's opinion over the position of the treating physicians. Id. at 602.
198. See Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 638.
199. See Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1992). In Wild-
bur, the court stated that in determining any inferences of a lack of good faith, it may review evidence
that was not presented to the administrator. 974 F.2d at 638. This is especially true since the courts
use a sliding scale to evaluate inferences of lack of good faith. See id.
200. See Salley, 966 F.2d at 1015. In Salley, the court held that DuPont had abused its discretion
because it relied upon opinions by independent physicians who neither obtained the medical records
nor examined the patient. Id. By deviating from the attending physician's opinion, DuPont incurred a
duty to investigate further the medical necessity of continued in-patient hospitalization. See id. at
1016. Importantly, the court rejected the "treating physician rule," which requires the court to defer
to a patient's treating physician's testimony unless there is substantial evidence contradicting his
testimony. See id. (relying on the rule utilized by the court in Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 59 (2d
Cir. 1991)). In rejecting the treating physician's rule in ERISA cases, the court reasoned that the
treating physician had a "clear and strong" conflict of interest because he would stand to profit greatly
if the court found that benefits should not be terminated. See id.
201. See Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 639.
202. See Lowry v. Bankers Life and Cas. Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 525 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 852 (1989).
203. See Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306 (1982).
204. See Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 639.
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Firestone decision. 205 In determining the appropriate standard of review
to analyze an ERISA administrator's denial of benefits, the first inquiry
made by the court is whether the plan contained language granting
discretionary authority to the plan administrator. 206 The court will make
this finding under the de novo standard, as in any typical contract
claim.207 There is no requirement that the plan language contain an "ex-
plicit" grant of discretionary authority to trigger the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard, nor are any magic words necessary. 208 In addition, the
terms "interpret" and "construe" in a plan are viewed interchangeably
when determining whether discretion is granted. 209 The amount of
deference the administrator is provided under the plan will determine the
amount of judicial deference applied to the administrator's decision. 210
The administrator's decision will not be disturbed under the arbi-
trary and capricious standard unless it is "downright unreasonable." 211
In other words, the administrator's denial of benefits will be upheld
under the arbitrary and capricious standard if it is "based on a reason-
able interpretation of the relevant plan documents" 2 12 or is "made
205. See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir.
1987); see also Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). In Van Boxel, the
court held that under the arbitrary and capricious standard, there may be a "sliding scale of judicial
review of trustees' decisions." 836 F.2d at 1052. Thus, the trustees' decision is given less deference
based on the more the trustees' impartiality can be fairly questioned. See id. at 1053.
206. See Donato v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 1994).
207. See Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d
1014, 1019-20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 372 (1998) (quoting Bechtold v. Physicians Health
Plan of N. Ind., Inc., 19 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1994)).
208. See Donato, 19 F.3d at 379 (citing Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. Swedish Ameri-
can Group Health Benefit Trust, 901 F.2d 1369, 1371 (7th Cir. 1990) for denial of this proposition). In
Donato, the plan's language, "[a]ll proof must be satisfactory to us," was sufficient to trigger the
arbitrary and capricious standard. Id.
209. See Chojnacki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing C. A. May
Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 557 F.2d 1163, 1165 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating "construe" and
"interpret" are often used synonymously)). These terms are important because in Firestone, the
United States Supreme Court held that the plan language must give the fiduciary authority to
"determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
210. See Cozzie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Morton
v. Smith, 91 F.3d 367, 870 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344
(7th Cir. 1995) (stating the more discretion conferred upon the fiduciary, the more deference the
subsequent decision is allowed) (citing Exbom v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Health and
Welfare Fund, 900 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1990)).
211. See Chojnacki, 108 F.3d at 816 (citing Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir.
1990)).
212. See Cuddington v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (NIPSCO), 33 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Shull v. State Mach. Co. Employees Profit Sharing Plan, 836 F.2d 306, 308 (7th Cir. 1987));
see also Exbom, 900 F.2d at 1143. In Exbom, the court held that under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, the denial of benefits will not be set aside if it is "based on a reasonable interpretation of the
plan documents" or if the decision is based "on a consideration of the relevant factors" that embody
the "important aspects of the problem." Id. (citing Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wis.,
846 F.2d 416, 420 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988)). In addition, if the trustee makes "an
informed judgment and articulates an explanation for it that is satisfactory in light of the relevant facts,
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rationally and in good faith."213 Similar to the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh
Circuit has described the arbitrary and capricious standard as a "range"
rather than a "point." 214  Courts are to consider several factors in
determining whether the administrator acted arbitrarily and capriciously:
"the impartiality of the decisionmaking body, the complexity of the
issues, the process afforded the parties, the extent to which the decision
makers utilized the assistance of experts where necessary, and finally the
soundness of the fiduciary's ratiocination." 215
Once a court makes its decision concerning discretionary authority,
it must then determine if the administrator operated under a conflict of
interest. 216 The Seventh Circuit recognizes that while a conflict of inter-
est does not change the standard of review applied to a plan admin-
istrator's decision, it does, however, cause the arbitrary and capricious
standard to be applied with "more bite." 217  Thus, the more serious the
conflict, the less deference the court affords the administrator's deci-
sions.2 18
The mere fact that a plan administrator receives a financial benefit
from denial of a claim is not an automatic conflict of interest in the
Seventh Circuit.219 First, there is a presumption that a fiduciary is acting
i.e., one that makes a 'rational connection' between the issue to be decided, the evidence in the case,
the text under consideration, and the conclusion reached, then the trustee's decision is final." Id.
(citing Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 936 (7th Cir. 1989)).
213. See Hightshue v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1144, 1147 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Brown v.
Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 521, 529 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987)). In Hightshue, the court rejected the plaintiffs assertion that the
doctrine of contra proferentum, which would require that ambiguities in a document be construed
against the drafter, should be adopted in ERISA cases. Id. at 1149. Instead, when the review by the
court is deferential, the administrator may conclusively interpret ambiguous plan terms and the court
will accept these conclusions so long as they are reasonable interpretations. See id. This doctrine,
however, is applicable when the administrator's decision is reviewed under the de novo standard of
review. See Morton, 91 F.3d at 871 n. I.
214. See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir.
1987). In Van Boxel, the court recognized that while purporting to apply the arbitrary and capricious
standard uniformly, the sliding scale analysis is more penetrating when the suspicion of partiality is
greater and less penetrating when the suspicion is smaller. Id. at 1052-53.
215. Chalmers, 61 F.3d at 1344 (quoting Exbom, 900 F.2d at 1142); see also Chojnacki, 108 F.3d
at 816 (stating that inconsistent interpretations of the plan is a consideration in determining if an
administrator acted unreasonably).
216. See Chojnacki, 108 F.3d at 815 (citing Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,
115 (1989)).
217. See id.; see also Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1052 (applying the sliding scale based upon the
suspicion of the partiality of the administrator).
218. See Chojnacki, 108 F.3d at 815. For example, the court in Chalmers held no conflict of in-
terest existed because the impact of the claim on the company was not significant. Chalmers, 61 F.3d
at 1344. Thus, the greater the impact on the company's welfare and the more motivated the company
to deny the claim, the less deference is given the administrator's decision. See id
219. See Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d
1014, 1020 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 372 (1998) (finding no conflict of interest since the defen-
dant was listed as a "Fortune 500" company and the plaintiff's claim was minuscule in comparison to
the defendant's bottom line); Chalmers, 61 F.3d at 1345 (holding no conflict of interest because the
denied claim paled in comparison to company revenues and denying benefit claims is a poor business
decision). But see Hightshue v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding a
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neutrally unless a plaintiff establishes through specific evidence that an
actual bias or a significant conflict existed. 220 Second, the Seventh Cir-
cuit deferred to ERISA § 1108(c)(3), which specifically allows an em-
ployer to appoint its own officers to administer an ERISA plan even if
the company is a party in interest. 221 The Seventh Circuit implied from
§ 1 108(c)(3) that ERISA contemplates less neutrality of plan admini-
strators than is required in a judicial forum. 222 Accordingly, the fact that
a party acts as both a plan administrator and as an insurer of the plan,
standing alone, does not constitute a conflict of interest. 223 In determin-
ing if an administrator is operating under a conflict of interest, the court
will look to the impact on the company's welfare of granting or denying
the claim and whether it was sufficiently substantial to threaten an admini-
strator's impartiality. 224 When a conflict of interest is found to exist, the
court scrutinizes the loyalty of the fiduciary. 225
Further, when the plan grants the administrator discretionary
authority, its decision must comport to the plain meaning of the plan;
otherwise, it is considered arbitrary and capricious. 226 However, it is not
the function of the court under the arbitrary and capricious standard to
determine whether it would have reached the same conclusion as the
administrator, or whether it would have relied on the same authority.227
The Seventh Circuit continues to strive for uniformity in ERISA actions,
conflict of interest existed since the defendant acted both as the claims administrator and the insurer).
220. See Mers, 144 F.3d at 1020. The existence of a potential conflict is insufficient. See id.; see
also Cuddington v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (NIPSCO), 33 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
the plaintiff must present specific evidence that the administrator had a conflict of interest when
deciding the claim).
221. See Chalmers, 61 F.3d at 1344 (holding that if an administrator's financial interests were a
judicial concern, ERISA would take measures to prohibit corporate officers from serving as plan
administrators).
222. See id.
223. See Mers, 144 F.3d at 1020 (noting that the 7th Circuit has rejected the theory that an in-
herent conflict exists when the company-sponsored plan allows an insurance company to interpret its
own policies); Cozzie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding the
defendant did not have a conflict of interest even though it acted as administrator and insurer since the
plaintiff did not establish that the defendant had a direct financial stake in the outcome of the plan
interpretation); see also Cuddington, 33 F.3d at 816 (holding the fact that defendant's employees
dominated a committee did not automatically constitute a conflict of interest).
224. See Chalmers, 61 F.3d at 1344.
225. See Hightshue v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir. 1998). In Hightshue, the
court held that when it is possible to question a fiduciary's loyalty, the fiduciary is obligated to engage
in an intensive independent investigation of its options to insure it is acting in the best interests of the
plan beneficiaries: "Seeking independent expert advice is evidence of a thorough investigation, and
provided that the fiduciary has investigated the expert's qualifications, has provided the expert with
complete and accurate information, and determined that reliance on the expert's advice is reasonably
justified under the circumstances, the fiduciary's decision will be respected, despite the conflict of
interest." Id. (citing Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1237
(1997)).
226. See Cozzie, 140 F.3d at 1108-09 (stating the administrator is bound by the terms of the plan
document and its interpretation cannot contradict the plain language of the plan).
227. See Mers, 144 F.3d at 1021.
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but the court only turns to common law when the plan is silent on an
issue. 228
Thus, the Seventh Circuit has adopted a traditional sliding scale
analysis for conflict of interest situations. 229 The Seventh Circuit does
not automatically infer a conflict of interest if the administrator receives
a financial gain in denying a claim. 230 Instead, there is a presumption
that a fiduciary is acting neutrally, and the plaintiff carries the burden of
rebutting this presumption by establishing that the plan administrator
had an actual bias or a significant conflict. 231 Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit appears to consider the big picture and be more objective in
determining whether a plan administrator is operating under a conflict of
interest.
d. Tenth Circuit
When a plan has granted an administrator discretionary authority in
awarding benefits or interpreting the terms of the plan, the Tenth Circuit
reviews the decision under an arbitrary and capricious standard, in ac-
cordance with the holding in Firestone.232 A plan administrator will be
held to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously if its decision was not
supported by substantial evidence. 233 The decision by the administrator
will not be disturbed under the arbitrary and capricious standard if it is a
reasonable interpretation of the terms of the plan. 234
The arbitrary and capricious standard is modified, however, if the
administrator is acting under a conflict of interest. 235 If the plan admin-
228. See id. at 1022.
229. See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir.
1987).
230. See Mers, 144 F.3d at 1020.
231. See id.
232. See Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Brunch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (holding denial of ERISA benefits
will be reviewed de novo unless the terms of the plan give the administrator discretionary authority to
determine benefit eligibility or construe the terms of the plan)). In Chambers, the arbitrary and
capricious standard was applicable since the plan expressly gave the administrator discretion to
determine insurance benefits for experimental procedures. See id.; see also McGraw v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding the arbitrary and capricious standard
was appropriate since the plan expressly granted the administrator discretion to decide what was
medically necessary).
233. See Sandoval v. Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1992). The court
in Sandoval defined substantial evidence as evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate
support for the conclusion reached by the administrator. Id. Substantial evidence requires "more than
a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Id. (quoting Flint v. Sullivan, 951 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.
1991)).
234. See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1259 (citing Semtner v. Group Health Serv. of Okla., Inc., 129
F.3d 1390, 1393 (10th Cir. 1997)).
235. See id. at 1258 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (holding the fiduciary's conflict of interest
is weighed as a factor in deciding if the fiduciary abused its discretion)).
NOTE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:815
istrator has a financial interest in the plan, a conflict of interest exists. 236
This, in turn, triggers a less deferential standard of review. 237 Therefore,
the degree of deference in a conflict of interest situation will decrease on
a sliding scale in proportion to the extent a conflict is present. 238 In
applying the sliding scale analysis, the court must remain mindful that
the arbitrary and capricious standard is inherently flexible. 239 The ad-
ministrator must act in the sole interest of the participants of the plan in
order to avoid a conflict of interest determination. 240 Accordingly, if the
administrator does not act in the sole interest of the plan participants and
is found to be operating under a conflict of interest, the arbitrary and
capricious standard will be adjusted on a sliding scale in proportion to
the degree of conflict that exists. 24 1
As a general proposition, the reviewing court is only allowed to
consider the evidence before the administrator at the time the decision
was made. 242 While this premise still rings true, it appears to have been
236. See Chambers, 100 F.3d at 825 (holding the administrator had a conflict of interest because
every board member deciding the plaintiffs' claims had a financial interest in the company); see also
McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1259 (finding a conflict of interest since every exercise of discretion by the
administrator impacted the company financially, either filling or depleting its coffers); Buchanan v.
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1180 (D. Kan. 1998) (finding a conflict of interest
was present since every decision affected the defendant financially).
237. See Pitman v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 123 (10th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Serv., 3 F.3d 80, 86-87 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that
when a fiduciary has a conflict of interest, the deference given to the fiduciary will be lessened to the
degree necessary to neutralize any influence resulting from the conflict)).
238. See Chambers, 100 F.3d at 826 (rejecting the presumptively void test and adopting the
sliding scale approach when analyzing an administrator's decision in a conflict of interest situation).
In Chambers, the court relied on the pre- Firestone decision in Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan
and Trust to adopt the sliding scale analysis. See Chambers, 100 F.3d at 286-87 (citing Sage v. Auto-
mation, Inc. Pension Plan and Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 895 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also Firestone, 489 U.S.
at 115. In Sage, the court utilized a modification of the arbitrary and capricious standard when ana-
lyzing a situation where the trustee's decision involved balancing of interests between current and
future claimants. Sage, 845 F.2d at 895. In doing so, it adopted the analysis from the Seventh Circuit
in Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, stating that the arbitrary and capricious
standard is sufficiently flexible to allow the court to adjust for instances where the trustee is biased in
favor of a third party or motivated by self interest. See Sage, 845 F.2d at 895 (citing Van Boxel v.
Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1049-53 (7th Cir. 1987)).
239. See McGraw, 137 F.3d at 1258.
240. See id. at 1263 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(1)(A) (1994)). The court also noted that there is
no balancing of interest in an ERISA action as it commands undivided loyalty by the administrator to
the plan participants. See id (quoting Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1996)).
241. See Chambers, 100 F.3d at 825 (stating that a conflict of interest triggers a less deferential
standard of review).
242. See id. at 823 (citing Sandoval v. Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 380 (10th Cir.
1992) (stating the district court can normally consider only the evidence before the administrator when
determining whether the administrator acted arbitrarily or capriciously)). In Sandoval, the court
recognized the primary goal of ERISA was providing a method for beneficiaries to resolve disputes
expeditiously and inexpensively, and it noted that allowing courts to consider evidence not presented to
the plan administrator would greatly impair achievement of that goal. Sandoval, 967 F.2d at 380
(quoting Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g a Div. of Lukens Gen. Indus., Inc., 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir.
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manipulated by the Tenth Circuit. 243 In Buchanan v. Reliance Standard
Life Insurance Company,2 44 the court recognized the general rule that
the reviewing court cannot consider additional evidence that was not
before the administrator at the time of its decision, but the court allowed
the plaintiff to introduce additional evidence for review on procedural,
rather than meritorious, grounds. 245
The court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff should not be
precluded from submitting additional evidence in support of the narrow
issue concerning the manner in which the administrator made its deci-
sion to assist the court in determining whether the administrator acted
arbitrarily.2 46 The court also allowed documents that were not part of
the administrative record, but were mentioned in a letter in the record to
be introduced, because they did not prejudice the defendant.247 Thus,
although limited, the courts in the Tenth Circuit appear to search for
latitude in allowing additional evidence to be introduced for considera-
tion by the reviewing court in deciding if the administrator acted arbi-
trarily or capriciously. 248 While there are differences in the specific
factors the courts utilize in the traditional sliding scale test, the courts
strongly adhere to the arbitrary and capricious standard regardless of the
degree of conflict.249
2. The Modified Sliding Scale Analysis
For lack of a better description, this section is titled the "modified
sliding scale analysis"; this describes the circuits that utilize the sliding
scale analysis without actually terming it as such or that apply it in a
non-traditional manner.250 For example, in some cases, the issue has
been presented to the court so recently that the application of the sliding
scale analysis has not yet had an opportunity to develop fully. 251
Moreover, the modified sliding scale analysis has evolved in some courts
1990)).
243. See Buchanan v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1180-81 (D. Kan.
1998).
244. 5 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D. Kan. 1998).
245. See Buchanan v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1181 (D. Kan. 1998).
The court allowed the plaintiff to introduce depositions not considered by the administrator in making
its decision. See id. The court stated that the depositions could be considered only to the extent they
shed light on the administrator's procedure in making its decision and not as they related to the
substance of the claim or decision. See id.
246. See id. (citing Chambers, 100 F.3d at 824 (allowing the court to look beyond the admini-
strative record in review of its interpretation but not to review the facts underlying the claim)).
247. See id.
248. See id. at 1180-81.
249. See, e.g., Ellis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that
under no circumstances will the court deviate from the abuse of discretion standard when the plan
language confers on the administrator discretionary authority).
250. See, e.g., Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993).
251. See Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st Cir. 1998).
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through interpretation of decisions deriving from courts that utilize the
presumptively void test.252 The First, Third, and Sixth Circuits fall into
these categories.
a. First Circuit
In Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. ,253 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted a hybrid or modification of the sliding scale
analysis. 254 Following Firestone, the court must initially resolve whether
the plan grants the administrator discretionary authority.255 While the
grant of discretionary authority must be clear, an explicit grant does not
appear to be required. 2 56 In Doyle, the court determined that Paul
Revere, the administrator, was granted discretion, which typically means
its decision will not be disturbed unless it is arbitrary and capricious. 257
Thus, the decision will be upheld if it was within the administrator's
authority, reasoned, and "supported by substantial evidence in the
record." 258 In turn, substantial evidence is defined in the First Circuit as
evidence reasonably sufficient to support a conclusion, regardless of
whether contradictory evidence was introduced.259
In Doyle, the court stated that a deferential standard may not
necessarily be warranted when a conflict of interest exists. 260 Additional-
ly, the court acknowledged the advantage of adopting a simple proce-
dure, such as an approach in which the decision of the administrator is
given no deference, meaning the decision is reviewed under the de novo
252. See Morris v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 986 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D.N.J. 1997) (looking to 11th
Circuit case law in applying a heightened level of the arbitrary and capricious standard).
253. 144 F.3d 181 (lst Cir. 1998).
254. See Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st Cir. 1998).
255. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (holding that if the
plan gives the administrator discretionary authority, the standard is abuse of discretion, but if the plan
does not give the administrator discretionary authority, the standard is de novo).
256. See Recupero v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 118 F.3d 820, 828 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting if
an ERISA out-of-court decisionmaker is given some discretion, the reviewing court can only
determine whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious); Diaz v. Seafarers Union, 13 F.3d 454,
456-58 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding the arbitrary and capricious standard was applicable when the plan
granted broad discretionary authority to the trustee); Caola v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 47,
50-51 (D. Mass. 1999) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard when a clear discretionary
grant was present in the language of the plan).
257. See Doyle, 144 F.3d at 183; see also Recupero, 118 F.3d at 837-38 (holding the plan admini-
strator did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying disability benefits to an employee whose injury
occurred on a coffee break, not during and in direct connection with the performance of the
employee's duties, as required by the plan).
258. See Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184 (citing Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104,
109 (1st Cir. 1997)).
259. See id. (citing Sprague v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Dep't




standard. 261 While recognizing this advantage, the court rejected it, hold-
ing that when the administrator is conferred discretion and operates
under a conflict of interest, the arbitrary and capricious standard will be
interpreted with "more bite" and with a special emphasis on reasonable-
ness. 262 However, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the
decision was improperly motivated. 263
In a recent decision, another panel of judges in the First Circuit,
although recognizing Doyle's adoption of the arbitrary and capricious
standard with "more bite," evaluated the administrator's decision based
on a "reasonable" requirement. 264 The court in Doe v. Travelers Insur-
ance Company265 justified this approach by indicating that the essential
requirement of reasonableness had substantial bite itself, at least when the
court was concerned with a specific treatment decision based on medical
criteria rather than a broad public policy issue. 266 The court further
reasoned that any reviewing court would be aware that payment of
claims cost the insurance company money and the company's general
interest in conserving its resources was not the type of conflict that
warranted de novo review. 267
While the First Circuit has not listed any factors or guidelines to
assist it in determining whether an administrator is operating under a
conflict of interest or improper motive, there is an indication that it
utilizes a weighing analysis. 268 In Doe, the court followed the analysis in
Doyle, stating that the mere fact that there would be a cost to the decision-
261. See id. (citing Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1997)). In
Armstrong, the court reviewed the decision of Aetna de novo because Aetna acted in the dual
capacity as plan administrator and insurer which created a continuing conflict of interest. Armstrong,
128 F.3d at 1265. The court was informed by the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit holding that a
relationship placing an ERISA plan administrator in "perpetual conflict" warranted a higher level of
scrutiny. See id. (citing Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (1Ilth
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991)).
262. See id. (quoting Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 971 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Mass. 1997) (stating
that in case of a conflict the court will "giv[e] 'more bite' to the arbitrary and capricious standard"),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 167 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1999)). The reasonableness factor evolved from
the sliding scale analysis in Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, where the court stated
that the judiciary must carefully scrutinize the administrator's decision to make sure it was reasonable.
See Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184 (citing Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048,
1053 (7th Cir. 1987)). Moreover, the court stated that not to require the plaintiff to prove the improper
motive faction would sacrifice the advantages of the arrangement. See id.
263. See id.
264. See Doe, 167 F.3d at 57 (stating Travelers' decision should be reviewed under a reasonable
standard, which is the basic touchstone of those types of cases and fine gradations in phrasing are
likely to complicate the standard); Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184.
265. See Doe, 167 F.3d at 57.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184. The court determined the facts that Paul Revere was a sub-
sidiary of Textron-plaintiff's employer-and that Paul Revere determined what claims it would pay
were not sufficient to establish an improper motive. See id.
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maker if an individual claim was paid was insufficient to show the deci-
sion was improperly motivated. 269 Accordingly, there is an implication
that the First Circuit may utilize the de novo standard when the admini-
strator's conflict of interest satisfies some imaginary threshold yet to be
determined. 270
The Doe court resolved the question concerning what "record"
should be evaluated by the court in judging the reasonableness of the
insurance company's decision. 271 The First Circuit had previously
avoided determination of this question despite recognizing it as un-
answered. 272 In Doe, the court stated that there is not one clear answer to
cover all the variations in ERISA cases. 273 The court determined,
however, that the record in that instance was information the insurance
company had in its possession at the time of its original decision. 274
Hence, although not necessarily termed a sliding scale analysis, the
arbitrary and capricious analysis with "bite" adopted by the First Circuit
for conflict of interest situations resembles the sliding scale test more
than any other. The "bite" facet of the analysis seems to imply that a
finding of a conflict will lessen the deference given to the admini-
strator's denial of plan benefits, and possibly diminish the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review to the point of a de novo standard. 275
Nonetheless, due to the recency and the internal conflict between the
decisions, the true application of the modified arbitrary and capricious
standard in the First Circuit remains to be seen.
269. See Doe, 167 F.3d at 57; Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184.
270. See Doe, 167 F.3d at 57. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court's decision in Fire-
stone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch stated that in situations where a plan fiduciary is exercising discre-
tion, but is found to be acting under a conflict of interest, the conflict must be a factor in determining
whether discretion was abused. See Doe, 167 F.3d at 57 (citing Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)). In addition, the court noted that the Supreme Court failed to explain
what constitutes a conflict and how the factor is to be weighed, creating divided opinions throughout
the courts. See id.
271. See id.
272. See Recupero v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 118 F.3d 820, 833 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting
that the question whether a court reviewing benefit determinations is restricted to the record con-
sidered by the decisionmaker who interpreted the plan was undecided and declining to consider the
question).
273. See Doe, 167 F.3d at 57. The court stated that the record may depend upon what was decid-
ed, by whom, based on what type of information, the standard of review, and the relief sought. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. (stating that the insurance company's general interest in conserving its resources was
not the kind of conflict that warranted de novo review); Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Group, 144
F.3d 181, 184 (lst Cir. 1998) (holding that in cases involving a conflict of interest, the arbitrary and




While it has not yet specifically ruled, the Third Circuit appears to
interpret the Supreme Court's Firestone decision as a directive to incor-
porate a weighing process when analyzing a conflict of interest situa-
tion.276 The Third Circuit, however, relies on case law from the Eleventh
Circuit, which utilizes the presumptively void test, for support in apply-
ing a heightened level of the arbitrary and capricious standard. 277 Thus,
the test adopted in the Third Circuit for conflict of interest situation is a
modified arbitrary and capricious analysis.
Through interpretation of Eleventh Circuit case law, a two-part test
has evolved for cases in which a plan administrator is motivated by
self-interest. 278 First, the court must review the administrator's decision
under the de novo standard to determine if it is a legally correct interpre-
tation of the relevant plan provisions. 279 Second, the court may inquire
if the decision was tainted by self-interest, even if it was reasonable. 280
The burden of establishing that a conflict of interest exists is on the
person who alleges that the administrator's exercise of discretion was
tainted by self-interest. 281 Decisions tainted by self-interest are deemed,
in the Third Circuit, to be arbitrary and capricious. 28 2
Further, when a party acts in a dual capacity as plan administrator
and as insurer, a "hobgoblin of self-interest" is created. 283 A "hobgob-
276. See Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 437 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that a con-
flict of interest warrants a heightened review of the administrator's decision). In Rizzo v. Paul Revere
Ins. Group, the court stated that while the Third Circuit has yet to decide a case involving an insurance
company that has been afforded discretion and is acting under a conflict of interest, it has also not
disapproved of the 11 th Circuit's presumptively void approach. Rizzo v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 925
F. Supp. 302, 309 (D.N.J. 1996), afftd, 111 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1997).
277. See Morris v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 986 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D.N.J. 1997). In Morris, the
court stated that the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard "ranges from slight to great,
depending upon the dynamics of the decisionmaking process." Id. (quoting Brown v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1564 (1 1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991)).
The court may apply a heightened level of scrutiny to an administrator's decision if the decision is
affected by a conflict of interest. See id.
278. See Rizzo, 925 F. Supp. at 309 (quoting Brown, 898 F.2d at 1566 n.12, 1567).
279. See id. at 309-10.
280. See id.
281. See Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non-Contributory Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 970
F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992).
282. See Morris, 986 F. Supp. at 882 (citing Rizzo, 925 F. Supp. at 310). In Morris, the court deter-
mined that Paul Revere's dual role as both claims administrator and issuing insurance company
created a "hobgoblin of self-interest." Id.
283. See id. (finding a conflict of interest that necessitated a stricter application of the arbitrary
and capricious standard since the defendant acted both as the plan administrator and the insurer);
Rizzo, 925 F. Supp. at 309 (quoting Brown, 898 F.2d at 1568); Nolen v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 32 F.
Supp. 2d 211, 216 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding an inherent conflict of interest exists when an insurance
company acts both as the insurer and claims administrator because when the claims administrator pays
a claim, the insurer incurs a direct expense). Compare Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433,
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lin of self-interest" is an inherent implication of self-interest, thereby
establishing a conflict of interest. 284 However, in order to warrant appli-
cation of a more stringent arbitrary and capricious standard, the record
must reflect a genuine conflict of interest. 285 If the court finds a conflict
of interest, it will undertake an independent evaluation of the signifi-
cance of the alleged bias to determine the appropriate level of deference
applicable to the administrator's decision. 286
Determining the appropriate standard of review is dependent upon
the terms of the plan and whether it affords the administrator discretion
in making decisions.287 The grant of discretion to the plan administrator
may be either express or implied in the plan.28 8 However, when deciding
if the terms of the plan confer discretionary authority on the admini-
strator, the plan provisions should be interpreted in light of all the
circumstances .289
If the court determines that the plan grants the administrator discre-
tionary authority, it must operate from the premise that the review of the
administrator's decision is guided by the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard.2 90 Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the administrator's
decision can be overturned only if it is "without reason, unsupported by
substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law." 291 In addition, the
437 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (determining there was no conflict of interest because defendant incurred no
direct expense resulting from the allowance or denial of benefits); with Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that although some degree of conflict inevitably
exists when a party acts both as the plan administrator and the employer, there was no conflict
because the defendant did not incur a direct expense in allowing or denying claim benefits); and
Kotrosits, 970 F.2d at 1173 (finding no conflict of interest because the administrator suffered no direct
impact and only a possible future indirect impact).
284. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1568.
285. See Rizzo, 925 F. Supp. at 308.
286. See Kotrosis, 970 F.2d at 1172 n.5.
287. See Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 44-45 (citing Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,
115 (1989) (holding denials of benefits under ERISA are reviewed de novo unless the plan grants the
administrator discretion to determine eligibility of benefits, in ,which case the arbitrary and capricious
standard is appropriate)); see also Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1254 (3d Cir. 1993)
(stating selection of the appropriate standard of judicial review is determined by the terms of the plan).
288. See Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, and Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d
Cir. 1991). In Luby, the court held that a general grant of discretionary power did not imply authority
to decide specific disputes between beneficiary claimants. See id. However, if discretion is expressly
granted in a specific area of the plan, that does not mean that the administrator has implied discretion
in a different area of the plan. See id. The court reasoned that if the drafters had intended to grant
discretion in another area, they would have done so expressly. See id. at 1181.
289. See Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1256. The court determined that where the terms of the plan con-
cering discretion are ambiguous, it will apply the rule of contra proferentum. See id at 1257. This
concept states that if the contract is susceptible to two or more meanings after applying normal con-
tract construction principles, the interpretation most favorable to the insured will be adopted. See id.
The court held that adoption of this principle is appropriate under ERISA because it promotes the pur-
pose of ERISA: to protect the contractually defined interests of employees and beneficiaries. See id.
290. See Rizzo, 925 F. Supp. at 308 (citing Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45).
291. See Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45 (quoting Adamo v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 720 F. Supp. 491,500
(W.D. Pa. 1989). In Abnathya, the court further noted that under the arbitrary and capricious
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scope of the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow, and the court is
not free to substitute its own judgment for the administrator's. 292 Im-
portantly, under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court is
limited to the same record available to the administrator at the time of its
decision.293 If, however, the plan does not grant discretionary authority
to the administrator, the standard is de novo, and the court is entitled to
supplement the record on review. 294
Therefore, if the plan does not give the plan administrator discre-
tion, the applicable standard of review is de novo. 295 However, if dis-
cretion is granted, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is
used. 296 Finally, if the administrator is granted discretionary authority
but is operating under a conflict, of interest, the applicable standard is a
heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 297 Thus, despite
adopting a test through analogy of Eleventh Circuit case law, the Third
Circuit appears to lean toward the sliding scale analysis in conflict of
interest situations.298
c. Sixth Circuit
Similar to the First Circuit, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has
indirectly adopted the sliding scale analysis for conflict of interest sce-
narios, despite never distinctly terming it as such.299 In determining the
appropriate standard of review in a conflict of interest scenario, the
reviewing court must first examine the plan and decide whether it grants
the administrator sufficient discretion to determine eligibility for benefits
standard, the court must defer to the administrator's decision unless it is clear that it is not supported
by evidence in the record or if the administrator has not complied with the plan procedures. See id. at
48.
292. See id. at 45 (quoting Lucash v. Strick Corp., 602 F. Supp. 430, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1984)).
293. See Morris v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 986 F. Supp. 872, 882 (D.N.J. 1997) (citing Stout v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 957 F. Supp. 673, 691 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that when reviewing a denial of
benefits under the arbitrary and capricious standard the court is behooved to consider only the
evidence available to the administrator at the time of its decision)).
294. See Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, and Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1185-87
(3d Cir. 1991). The court in Luby held that not allowing additional evidence when the plan
administrator's decision is reviewed de novo made little sense and is contrary to the concept of de
novo review. See id. at 1184. The court is not, however, required to conduct a de novo evidentiary
hearing, because if the record is sufficiently developed the court can simply make its own de novo
benefit determination. See id. at 1185.




298. See id. at 882 (holding a stricter application of the arbitrary and capricious standard is ap-
plicable where the administrator is acting under a conflict of interest).
299. See Peruzzi v. Summa Med. Plan, 137 F.3d 431, 433 (6th Cir. 1998). In Peruzzi, the court
recognized that a conflict of interest does not alter the standard of review, but it rather should be taken
into account as a factor in determining if the decision was arbitrary and capricious. See id. (citing
Davis v. Kentucky Fin. Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 694 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
905 (1990)).
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or construe the terms of the plan. 300 In order to trigger the arbitrary and
capricious standard, the language granting discretionary authority in the
plan must be clear. 30 1 Further, the Sixth Circuit has indicated that "dis-
cretion is not an all-or-nothing proposition." 302 While the exact word
"discretion" is unnecessary, each plan must be read in its entirety, and
the language relied on to create the degree of discretion is reviewed
in context. 303 Upon establishing a degree of discretion under the plan,
the reviewing court must then determine "the exact contours of the
discretionary authority." 304
A plan administrator's decision concerning eligibility for benefits is
not arbitrary and capricious if it is "rational in light of the plan's pro-
300. See Wulf v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 26 F.3d 1368, 1373 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1058 (1994). In developing this initial step in the analysis, the court relied on language in
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch stating that a denial of benefits by a plan administrator should
be reviewed de novo unless the language of the plan grants the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine benefit eligibility. See Wulf, 26 F.3d at 1372-73 (citing Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989)); see also Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
925 F.2d 979, 983 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding application of the highly deferential arbitrary and
capricious standard is applicable only when the plan grants the administrator or fiduciary discretionary
authority to determine benefit eligibility).
301. See Wulf, 26 F.3d at 1373 (citing Anderson v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 942 F.2d 392,
395 (6th Cir. 1991), on remand, 777 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Mich. 1991)).
302. Id. In Anderson, the court recognized that a plan can give an administrator discretion to
make some decisions, but not others. Anderson, 942 F.2d at 395. Therefore, a plan administrator has
"exactly the amount and type of discretion granted by the plan, no more, and no less." Id. On re-
mand, the federal district court agreed with the Sixth Circuit's holding and determined both that the
only right conferred on the administrator under the plan was the amount of benefits and that no provi-
sion granted the administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility or construe the terms of
the plan. See Anderson v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 777 F. Supp. 1374, 1376 (E.D. Mich.
1991); see also Wulf, 26 F.3d at 1374 (finding the language granted nothing more than authority to
make rules for administration of the plan). In Wulf, the court relied on Kirwan v. Marriott Corp.,
where the language "authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the [p]lan"
and authority to "promulgate such rules and regulations as deemed necessary and proper to interpret
the [p]lan" was held to grant administrative powers and thus were insufficient to trigger the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review. Wulf 26 F.3d at 1374 (citing Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d
784, 788 (1 1th Cir. 1994)).
303. See Wulf, 26 F.3d at 1373; see also Miller, 925 F.2d at 983-84. The court in Miller relied on
a similar definition of "disabled," interpreted in Bali v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n, to find a
granting of discretion. Miller, 925 F.2d at 983-84 (relying on Bali v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n,
873 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989)). The relevant language in the plan influencing the court
indicated that disability was determined "on the basis of medical evidence satisfactory to the insurer."
Id. The court in Bali held that while the provision did not grant complete discretion to the insurer in
ultimately determining disability, it did grant discretion in deciding what evidence may be required
from an applicant to provide a basis for making a disability determination. Bali, 873 F.2d at 1047.
However, the administrator's requests for additional information must be reasonable in order to be
within its discretion. See id. Similarly, under the plan in Miller, Metropolitan was granted discretion to
make reasonable requests for documentation and to determine what evidence may be required to
establish a basis for a disability determination. Miller, 925 F.2d at 984. Accordingly, the appropriate
standard of review was arbitrary and capricious. See id.
304. Anderson, 942 F.2d at 395 (finding the plan administrator's authority is limited to that grant-
ed in the plan). On remand, this premise was sustained. See Anderson, 777 F. Supp. at 1 376.
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visions" 305 or is the result of a "deliberate principled reasoning process
supported by substantial evidence." 306 Further, when it is possible to
offer a reasoned explanation for a specific outcome, based on the
evidence, that outcome is not arbitrary and capricious. 307 In the Sixth
Circuit, arbitrary and capricious is equated with "unreasonable." 30 8
Accordingly, while a conflict of interest does not alter the standard of
review, it should be taken into consideration as a factor in determining
whether the administrator's decision was arbitrary and capricious. 309
Importantly, an administrator who both funds and administers the
plan is determined to be acting under an actual and readily apparent
conflict of interest, rather than a potential conflict, if it receives a direct
financial benefit from denial or discontinuation of benefits. 310 The ques-
tion then becomes whether the administrator was improperly influenced
by its conflict. 311 In reviewing the denial of benefits under ERISA, the
court must strictly adhere to the general proposition that review is limited
to the information actually considered by the administrator at the time it
made its final decision. 312 This limitation, however, has been expanded
to include information considered and received by the administrator dur-
ing the administrative appeals process. 3 13 Further, the Sixth Circuit has
305. Miller, 925 F.2d at 984 (citing Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 826 (1988)); see also Perry v. United Food and Commercial Workers Dist. Unions
405 and 442, 64 F.3d 238, 241 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating on outcome is not arbitrary or capricious when it
is possible to offer a reasoned explanation based on the evidence).
306. Killian v. Healthsource Provident Adm'r, Inc., 152 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing
Baker v. United Mine Workers of Am. Health and Retirement Funds, 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir.
1991)).
307. See Perry, 64 F.3d at 241 (citations omitted).
308. See Peruzzi v. Summa Med. Plan, 137 F.3d 431, 433 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Wendy's Int'l,
Inc. v. Karsko, 94 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir. 1996)). The proper inquiry focuses on determination of
the reasonableness of the plan administrator's decision rather than the reasonableness of the denied
treatment. See id. at 435.
309. See id. at 433 (citing Davis v. Kentucky Fin. Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 694 (6th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1990)).
310. See Killian, 152 F.3d at 521., The defendant in Killian Healthsource both funded and admini-
stered the plan. See id. Accordingly, the court found that Healthsource acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously when it refused to consider additional information submitted by the plaintiff, and it held that
refusal made no sense in the absence of an improper financial motive. See id. at 522. Therefore,
Healthsource's actions were shaped by its conflict of interest. See id.
311. See id. at 521 (rejecting Healthsource's assertion that both funding and administering the
plan only gives rise to a potential conflict of interest).
312. See Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g a Div. of Lukens Gen. Indus., Inc., 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir.
1990); see also Killian, 152 F.3d at 522 (holding the district court erred in conducting its own review of
material not available to the administrator at the time of its decision); Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 925 F.2d 979, 986 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding the court may only consider evidence available to the
administrator at the time the final decision was made).
313. See id.
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applied this limitation to both an arbitrary and capricious standard, 314 as
well as the de novo standard of review. 315
Therefore, in the Sixth Circuit, the plan must clearly grant the
administrator discretionary authority to determine benefit eligibility or
construe the terms of the plan in order to trigger the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review. 316 Significantly, if a single entity both
funds and administers the plan, thereby incurring a direct expense when
allowing claims and directly benefiting from denying of claims, an
actual conflict of interest exists.3 17 Finally, the Sixth Circuit, while con-
tinuing to adhere to the general rule, has included within the scope of the
record available to the reviewing court any information before the
administrator during the entire administrative process, including the
appeals process. 318
In conclusion, although the circuits applying the sliding scale analy-
sis share the same test, its actual application differs significantly. 319 For
example, some circuits find that an inherent conflict of interest exists if
the plan administrator has any financial incentive in the denial of bene-
fits, whereas other circuits balance the degree of financial gain in the
denial of a claim with the overall assets of the corporation. 320 In addi-
tion, individual factors have been developed by the circuits to assist in
applying the sliding scale analysis. 32 1 As a result, application of the slid-
ing scale analysis is not uniform throughout the circuits that have either
directly or indirectly adopted it in a traditional or modified capacity.
314. See Crews v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332,
336 (6th Cir. 1986).
315. See Perry, 900 F.2d at 966 (applying the de novo standard of review).
316. See Wulf v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 26 F.3d 1368, 1373 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1058 (1994).
317. See Killian, 152 F.3d at 521.
318. See Miller, 925 F.2d at 984.
319. Compare, Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 639 (5th Cir. 1992) (allowing the re-
viewing court to review information outside the administrative record in deciding whether the plan
administrator's decision was arbitrary and capricious), with Miller, 925 F.2d at 986 (indicating the
record includes all information before the administrator at the time of its final decision, including the
administrative appeals process).
320. Compare Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d
1014, 1020 (7th Cir.) (finding no inherent conflict of interest existed because the plaintiff's claim
would cost the company $200,000 and the company was one of the 50 largest companies in the "For-
tune 500" listing), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 372 (1998), with Killian, 152 F.3d at 521 (holding an actual
and readily apparent conflict of interest exists where an administrator both funds and administers the
plan).
321. Compare, Haley v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 84, 89 (4th Cir. 1996) (adopting a
modified version of the Restatement factors in determining if a plan administrator abused its dis-
cretion), with Jordan v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 900 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.




C. THE PRESUMPTIVELY VOID TEST
The presumptively void test is a minority approach to the conflict of
interest analysis. 322 This test is derived from the common law of trusts,
by which any action taken by a trustee in violation of its fiduciary
obligation is presumptively void.323 The significant difference between
the presumptively void standard and the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard is that, under the presumptively void analysis, once the claimant has
demonstrated that the plan administrator is operating under a substantial
conflict of interest, the burden shifts to the plan administrator to prove
that its interpretation of the plan was not tainted by self-interest. 324 The
burden-shifting component of the presumptively void test is based on
the premise that a failure to shift the burden would leave beneficiaries
unprotected.3 25
1. Eleventh Circuit
The presumptively void test originated in the Eleventh Circuit.3 2 6
The Eleventh Circuit recognizes three distinct standards of review in
ERISA claims: 1) de novo, applied when the plan does not grant the
administrator discretion, 2) arbitrary and capricious, used when the plan
grants discretionary authority to the administrator, and 3) heightened
arbitrary and capricious, employed if the plan administrator has a
conflict of interest. 327 As in all circuits, the threshold question, whether
the plan grants the administrator discretionary authority, must be an-
swered to determine which of the above standards of review is appropri-
ate. 328 To invoke the arbitrary and capricious standard, the plan must
contain express unambiguous language giving the administrator dis-
322. See, e.g., Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125
F.3d 794, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1997).
323. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 95, at 341-42 (West rev. 6th ed. 1986). For example, the plan administrator has a fiduciary obliga-
tion to act in the sole interest of the plan participants and beneficiaries. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1994).
If the plan administrator's actions are motivated to serve an interest other than the benefit of the plan
participants, the actions are deemed presumptively void. See Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1565 (1 1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
324. See Stvartak v. Eastman Kodak Co., 945 F. Supp. 1532, 1353 (M.D. Fla. 1996), aff'd, 144
F.3d 54 (11th Cir. 1998).
325. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1565.
326. See id.
327. See Buckley v. Metropolitan Life, 115 F.3d 936, 939 (1lth Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 129
F.3d 617 (11 th Cir. 1997) (citing Marecek v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 49 F.3d 702, 705 (11 th Cir.
1995)).
328. See Godfrey v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 89 F.3d 755, 757 (1Ilth Cir. 1996).
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cretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or construe the
terms of the plan. 329
A very methodical process has been developed in the Eleventh
Circuit for analyzing an ERISA denial of benefits in which the plan
administrator has discretionary authority and is operating under a
conflict of interest. 330 The first step in the application of the arbitrary
and capricious standard is determining whether the administrator's inter-
pretation of the provision was legally correct. 331 If the administrator's
decision is legally incorrect, the court then must evaluate the self-interest
of the administrator. 332 The plan beneficiary must demonstrate a sub-
stantial conflict of interest on the part of the administrator responsible
for benefit determination. 333 The burden then shifts to the fiduciary to
prove that its discretionary interpretation of the plan was not tainted by
self-interest. 334  Thus, even though the administrator's interpretation is
reasonable, it is deemed arbitrary and capricious if it advances the con-
flicting interests of the administrator at the expense of plan benefici-
aries. 335 However, this finding can be rebutted if the administrator can
justify its interpretation on the grounds that it will benefit the class of all
plan participants and beneficiaries. 336
Next, the court must evaluate whether the administrator acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in its interpretation of the plan. 337 The
Eleventh Circuit determines whether the administrator's interpretation
was "wrong" by utilizing the de novo standard of review. 338 An ad-
329. See Stvartak, 945 F. Supp. at 1535 n.1 (citing Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784, 785,
789 (1 1th Cir. 1994)).
330. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1566-67.
331. See Stvartak, 945 F. Supp. at 1535 (noting that the court must decide if the administrator has
proposed a sound interpretation of the plan when determining whether the interpretation is legally
correct).
332. See id.
333. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1566.
334. See id. The court stated that judicial hesitation inquiring into the fiduciary's motives will
leave beneficiaries unprotected unless the existence of a substantial conflicting interest shifts the bur-
den to the fiduciary to demonstrate its decision is not infected with self-interest. See id. at 1565. The
reasons provided by the administrator to prove it was not tainted by self-interest need not be com-
pelling, only sufficient to take them out of the arbitrary mold. See id. at 1567 (quoting Fine v. Semet,
699 F.2d 1091, 1095 (1llth Cir. 1983)).
335. See id. at 1566-67.
336. See id.
337. See id. at 1559 (stating that the court must determine if the administrator acted arbitrarily
and capriciously by determining whether there was a reasonable basis for its decision based on the
facts known to the administrator at the time the decision was made) (citing Jett v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Ala., Inc. 890 F.2d 1137, 1139 (11th Cir. 1989)).
338. See id. at 1566 n.12.
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ministrator's interpretation of the plan is wrong if it is motivated by
self-interest. 339
Significantly, actions by the plan administrator that are tainted by
self-interest are considered to be conflicting interests to that of the plan
participants and may be deemed an inherent conflict. 340 An inherent
conflict of interest exists when the source of the funding of the plan also
serves as the administrator in determining eligibility for benefits that are
paid from the funding source's assets.341 This conflict of interest analy-
sis was derived from a review of the trust principle of "improper
motive" by a trustee.342
In determining whether the administrator's decision was arbitrary
and capricious, the court is limited to deciding if the plan interpretation
was made rationally and in good faith, not if it was correct.343 The con-
cept of "reasonable basis" must be modified in the application of the
arbitrary and capricious standard when the administrator is operating
under a conflict of interest. 344 Further, the arbitrary and capricious
standard must be "contextually tailored." 345 The court is limited to
339. See Stvartak v. Eastman Kodak Co., 945 F. Supp. 1532, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1996), aftd, 144
F.3d 54 (11th Cir. 1998).
340. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1565.
341. See id. at 1561 (holding that since the insurance company paid beneficiaries from the assets
of its trust, its fiduciary role was in perpetual conflict with its profit-making role as a business); see
also Vann v. National Rural Elec. Co-op Ass'n Retirement and Sec. Program, 978 F. Supp. 1025, 1035
(M.D. Ala. 1997) (stating an inherent conflict of interest exists when the administrator incurs a direct,
immediate expense from a benefits determination). In addition, the Eleventh Circuit also does not
distinguish, in an ERISA analysis, between a fiduciary and a plan administrator. See Brown, 898 F.2d
at 1560.
342. See id. at 1565 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. g (1959)) (noting that
courts must consider the fact that the trustee has an interest which conflicts with the beneficiary). The
court further noted that an administrator may consciously or unconsciously favor its interests over
those of the plan fiduciaries. See id. (citing Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Tate, 363 F.2d 562, 571 (5th Cir.
1966)).
343. See Vann, 978 F. Supp. at 1038 (citing Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1517 (1lth Cir.
1997), reh'g denied, 124 F.3d 223 (1 1th Cir. 1997)). The court utilized factors to assist in applying the
arbitrary and capricious standard: "I) the uniformity of the administrator's construction; 2) the
reasonableness of its interpretation; 3) possible concerns with the way unexpected costs may affect
the future financial health of the plan." Id. (citing Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1517). Additional factors for
evidence of good faith include: "1) the internal consistency of the plan under the interpretation given
by the administrators; 2) any relevant regulations formulated by the appropriate administrative
agencies; 3) the factual background of the determination by the plan administrator and inferences of
lack of good faith, if any." Id. (citing Blank v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 926 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 938 (1991)).
344. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1559. The court looked to the Restatement factors for assistance in
measuring the arbitrary and capricious standard:
1) the extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee by the terms of the trust; 2) the
purposes of the trust; 3) the nature of the power; 4) the existence or non-existence, the
definiteness or indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the reasonableness of the
trustee's conduct can be judged; 5) the motives of the trustee in exercising the power; 6)
the existence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with that of the beneficiaries.
Id. at 1564-65 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d).
345. See id. at 1564.
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review of the facts available to the administrator at the time the decision
to deny benefits was made. 346 However, application of the arbitrary and
capricious standard is shaped by the circumstances of an inherent
conflict of interest. 347 The Eleventh Circuit recognizes the arbitrary and
capricious standard as a range rather than a fixed point.348 Finally, the
degree of deference given the administrator's decision varies according-
ly from slight to great depending upon the circumstances surrounding
the administrator's decisionmaking process. 349
2. Ninth Circuit
Although early Ninth Circuit case law lacked certainty regarding the
degree of deference afforded the decision of a plan administrator acting
under a conflict of interest, 350 it eventually adopted the presumptively
void test.351 The court reviews de novo the district court's choice of the
standard of review in determining if a plan administrator acted arbitrarily
or capriciously. 352 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Firestone,
the Ninth Circuit reviews an ERISA denial of benefits de novo unless the
plan grants the administrator discretionary authority to determine benefit
eligibility or construe the terms of the plan in which case the arbitrary
and capricious standard is utilized.353 If, however, the administrator is
deemed to have a conflict of interest, a heightened arbitrary and capri-
cious standard applies. 354
In the Ninth Circuit, a conflict of interest warranting heightened
scrutiny may be found to exist by the sole fact that a plan administrator
346. See Stvartak v. Eastman Kodak Co., 945 F. Supp. 1532, 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1996), aff'd, 144
F.3d 54 (11 th Cir. 1998).
347. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1563.
348. See id. at 1564 (citing Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048,
1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987)).
349. See id.
350. See Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing
that when the administrator is colored by a conflict of interest, a more stringent version of the abuse of
discretion standard is applied but noting that the precise nature of the less deferential review is
unclear).
351. See Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting the
Eleventh Circuit presumptively void test from Brown, 898 F.2d 1556). While the court recognized both
the sliding scale and presumptively void tests, it determined that the Eleventh Circuit's presumptively
void analysis more closely resembled the methodology of the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 1323.
352. See Taft, 9 F.3d at 1471. Additionally, the 9th Circuit has determined that the terms "arbi-
trary and capricious" and "abuse of discretion" are a distinction without a difference. See id. at 1471
n.2 (citing Cox v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 572 n.3 (8th Cir. 1992), affd on appeal
after remand, 13 F.3d 272 (8th Cir. 1993)).
353. See id. (citing Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).
354. See Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1322 (holding that a less deferential abuse of discretion is applied
when a conflict caused a serious breach of the administrator's fiduciary duty).
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has an economic stake in benefit decisions. 355 Additionally, if a party
acts in a dual capacity as the plan administrator and as a funding source,
an inherent conflict of interest exists, triggering the higher standard. 356
However, the presence of a conflict of interest does not automatically
strip all deference given to the administrator's decision. 357
In order to dismiss the arbitrary and capricious standard and trigger
de novo review in situations where a plan administrator with discretion-
ary authority is colored by a conflict of interest, a two-step analysis has
been developed. 358 First, the beneficiary who was denied benefits has the
burden of providing "material, probative evidence, beyond the mere fact
of the apparent conflict, tending to show that the fiduciary's self interest
caused a breach of the administrator's fiduciary obligations to the
beneficiary." 359 If the beneficiary fails to meet this burden, the tradi-
tional arbitrary and capricious standard of review is applied. 360 Second,
if the beneficiary proves that a conflict of interest existed, the burden
shifts to the plan administrator to show that the conflict did not affect its
decision in denying benefits. 361 If the plan administrator cannot rebut
this presumption, the administrator's decision is reviewed de novo and
without deference to the administrator's tainted exercise of discretion. 362
If the plan administrator successfully rebuts this presumption, the
court utilizes the arbitrary and capricious standard.363 The decision of
the plan administrator is considered to be arbitrary and capricious if the
decision is "without any explanation, or construe[s] provisions of the
plan in a way that conflicts with the plain language of the plan." 364
When determining if the plan administrator acted arbitrarily and capri-
355. See id. (referring to Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517, 1524 (9th Cir.
1993)).
356. See Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d
794, 797 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Brown, 898 F.2d at 1561 (finding that the fact that the insurance
company paid benefits from its own assets and was the administrator placed it in perpetual conflict
with its profit-making role)).
357. See id.
358. See Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1323.
359. Id.
360. See id.
361. See id. If the beneficiary provides material evidence that the administrator violated its
fiduciary obligation, no deference is given to the presumptively void decision. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id. (finding plaintiff failed to show a breach of fiduciary interest; therefore, the appropri-
ate standard was abuse of discretion).
364. Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Eley v.
Boeing Co., 945 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1991)). Importantly, the court will construe the plan in
accordance with the rules normally applied to insurance policies. See Lang v. Long-Term Disability
Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 1997). In that capacity, the
court will apply the doctrine of contra proferentum, which requires any disputed plan terms to be
interpreted against the drafter. See id. (adopting the reasonable definition advanced by the plaintiff).
1999] 857
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ciously, the district court is limited to review of the evidence presented to
the plan administrator at the time of its decision.3 6
5
Thus, a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard is employed
when the plan administrator is operating under a conflict of interest.
3 66
However, if the claimant establishes by material, probative evidence that
the administrator was acting out of self interest, the burden then shifts to
the plan administrator to show its action was not influenced by self-
interest.3 67 If the plan administrator fails to rebut this finding effectively,
its decision is evaluated under the de novo standard of review. 368
In summary, the presumptively void test contains several unique
components, most significantly the burden-shifting framework. 369 How-
ever, as in all other circuits, if the plan language grants the plan admini-
strator discretionary authority, then the administrator's decision to deny
benefits is reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
370 If it
is determined that the administrator's decision was tainted by a substan-
tial interest, there is a presumption that the decision is void. 371 Impor-
tantly, at this point the burden shifts to the administrator to rebut this
presumption. 372 If the administrator fails to rebut this presumption suc-
cessfully, the administrator's decision is reviewed under the de novo
standard.3 73 Conversely, if the administrator does successfully rebut this
presumption, then the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is
applied .374
365. See Taft, 9 F.3d at 1471 (quoting Jones v. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d
480, 482 (9th Cir. 1990)). The court determined that limiting review to the administrative record pro-
moted the goals of ERISA, conformed to the decisions in other circuits, and was consistent with the
nature of the arbitrary and capricious standard. See id.
366. See Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1322.
367. See id. at 1323.
368. See id.
369. See id. (stating once the affected beneficiary proves a violation of the administrator's fi-
duciary obligation, the plan bears the burden of producing evidence to show that the conflict did not
affect its decision to deny benefits).
370. See id.
371. See Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d
794, 797 (9th Cir. 1996).





IV. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ADOPTION OF THE SLIDING SCALE
ANALYSIS IN WOO V. DELUXE CORPORATION
A. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT SLIDING SCALE ANALYSIS
As in every circuit, the Eighth Circuit determines the applicable
standard of review in an ERISA claim for denial of benefits through in-
terpretation of the United States Supreme Court opinion in Firestone.375
Accordingly, the threshold issue is whether the plan grants the admini-
strator discretionary authority to determine benefit eligibility or construe
the terms of the plan. 376 If the plan provides such discretion, the arbi-
trary and capricious standard is utilized. 377  There appears to be a re-
quirement in the Eighth Circuit that the plan language must expressly
grant the administrator discretionary authority to trigger the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review.378
The court then reviews de novo the district court's application of
the deferential standard of review. 379 An administrator's decision will be
upheld under the arbitrary and capricious standard if it is supported by
substantial evidence 380 or is determined to be reasonable. 381 However,
the administrator's decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is "extraor-
dinarily imprudent or extremely unreasonable." 382 While application of
375. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). The all too familiar
language states that a denial of benefits under ERISA is reviewed de novo unless the plan grants the
administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or construe terms of the plan,
in which case the applicable standard is abuse of discretion. See id. at 114-15.
376. See Finley v. Special Agents Mut. Benefit Ass'n, Inc., 957 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding the first issue to be resolved is whether the plan language gives the board discretionary
authority to construe a "confrontational situation"). The Eighth Circuit has uniformly held that the
contra insurer rule, which requires that ambiguity in the language of the contract is to be construed
against interests of the insurer, violates ERISA provisions. See Whiteside v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 798 F. Supp. 1380, 1386 (D. Minn. 1992); see also Finley, 957 F.2d at 619 (holding the common
rule of construction that ambiguous language in an insurance contract should be reviewed against the
drafter in favor of the insured has no place in the de novo construction of an ERISA plan).
377. See Wald v. Southwestern Bell Corp. Customcare Med. Plan, 83 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that the plan indisputably gave the administrator discretion to interpret the plan, so the
proper standard was abuse of discretion).
378. See Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating the abuse
of discretion is the standard of review if the plan specifically gives the administrator authority to
construe its terms); Jader v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Minn. 1989) (applying
the de novo standard since nothing in the plan gave the administrator express authority to determine
benefit eligibility or general term construction).
379. See Boiling v. Eli Lilly and Co., 990 F.2d 1028, 1029 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Bernards v.
United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 486, 488 (8th Cir. 1993)).
380. See Farley v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 147 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir. 1998).
381. See Cox v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 572 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating the
administrator's decision is subject to a reasonableness standard rooted in trust law principles), ajffd on
appeal after remand, 13 F.3d 272, 274 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating the court will affirm a reasonable
interpretation of a plan).
382. See Lickteig v. Business Men's Assurance Co. of Am., 61 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir. 1995).
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any of these inquiries is proper, preference has been established for
overturning a plan administrator's decision only if it is "without reason,
unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law." 38 3
In determining whether the administrator's decision was reasonable,
the court considers five factors: 1) whether the administrator's interpre-
tation is consistent with the goals of the plan; 2) whether the administra-
tor's interpretation renders any language in the plan meaningless or
internally inconsistent; 3) whether the administrator's decision interpre-
tation conflicts with ERISA substantive or procedural requirements; 4)
whether the administrator has consistently interpreted the words in ques-
tion; and 5) whether the administrator's interpretation is contrary to the
clear language of the plan.384 In reviewing an administrator's decision,
all five factors should be applied or an explanation should be given as to
why a particular factor is inapplicable. 385 If the administrator's decision
is supported by a reasonable explanation, it should not be disturbed,
regardless of whether a different reasonable interpretation could have
been reached. 386
In order to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard properly, the
reviewing court must be provided the rationale underlying the adminis-
trator's discretionary decision. 38 7 If the administrator fails to provide an
adequate explanation of how it reached its decision, the reviewing court
must seek a fuller explanation from the administrator and then apply the
deferential standard. 388 In deciding if the plan administrator's decision
383. See Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 900 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Abnathya v. Hoff-
mann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993)) A trustee's decision is reasonable if a reasonable
person could have reached a similar decision, rather than if a reasonable person would have reached
the same decision. See id. at 899. The court further defined "reasonable," explaining that the
administrator's decision does not have to be the only sensible interpretation as long as its decision has a
"reasoned explanation, based on evidence, for a particular outcome." Id. (quoting Krawczyk v.
Harnischfeger Corp., 41 F.3d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 1994)). Substantial evidence is defined as "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 900
n.10 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938)). In quantifiable terms,
"[s]ubstantial evidence requires 'more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance."' Id. (quoting
Sandoval v. Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1992)).
384. See Finley v. Special Agents Mut. Benefit Ass'n, Inc., 957 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1992)
(citing De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1188 (4th Cir. 1989)); see also Cox, 965 F.2d at 572.
In Cox, the court listed the six factors from the Restatement for consideration in determining whether
the administrator abused its discretion. See id. (quoting R EsTrTAMaEr (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 174 cmt. d
(1959)). The court indicated that the test articulated in Finley was essentially an application of the
Restatement factors. See id. (citing Finley, 957 F.2d at 621).
385. See Lickteig, 61 F.3d at 584 (encouraging district courts to apply all five factors or explain
why a certain factor does not apply).
386. See Cash v. Wal-Mart Group Health Plan, 107 F.3d 637, 641 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Cox, 965
F.2d at 572).
387. See Cox, 965 F.2d at 574 (holding that ERISA principles require that administrators ade-
quately explain the basis for their discretionary decisions).
388. See Bemards v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 486, 488-89 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing
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was arbitrary or capricious, the court is limited to a review of the
evidence before the administrator when its decision was made. 389 More-
over, in accord with trust law, the reviewing court is not permitted to
reject an administrator's discretionary decision simply because the court
disagrees with the conclusion. 390 Thus, the deferential arbitrary and
capricious standard shows that courts are hesitant to interfere with the
administration of a pension plan.391
However, certain situations may exist in which factors outside the
administrator's actual decision mandate the application of a less deferen-
tial arbitrary and capricious standard. 392 In order to trigger heightened
arbitrary and capricious review, the beneficiary must present material,
probative evidence demonstrating that: 1) a palpable conflict of interest
or a serious procedural irregularity existed, and it 2) caused a serious
breach of the plan administrator's fiduciary duty to the plan benefici-
ary. 393 In order to satisfy the second step of this analysis, the beneficiary
need only show that the conflict or procedural irregularity had some
connection to the substantive decision reached by the administrator.394
BOGERT & B OGERT, supra note 102, § 560, at 201-04). For example, in Bernards, the cryptic letters
from the plan administrator denying plan benefits failed to provide sufficient rationale to permit
judicial review of the decision. See id. at 488.
389. See Collins v. Central States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Health and Welfare Fund, 18 F.3d 556,
560 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Oldenburger v. Central States S.E. and S.W. Areas Teamster Pension Fund,
934 F.2d 171, 174 (8th Cir. 1991)). Courts are also discouraged from considering additional evidence
not before the administrator even when the administrator's decision is reviewed under the de novo
standard. See Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993). This is to ensure the
expeditious judicial review of ERISA benefit decisions and prevent the courts from becoming
substitute plan administrators. See id.
390. See Cox, 965 F.2d at 572 (quoting BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 102, § 560, at 201-04)
(stating it is not necessarily an abuse of discretion if the court believes an ordinary prudent person
would not have reached the same conclusion as the discretionary decision)); see also Bremer v.
Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1060 (D. Minn. 1997) (stating the court will
uphold the administrator's decision if it is reasonable, even if it is not the best interpretation possible).
391. See Maune v. International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local No. 1, Health and Wel-
fare Fund, 83 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Cox v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 13 F.3d 272,
274 (8th Cir. 1993)).
392. See Buttram v. Central States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Health and Welfare Fund, 76 F.3d 896,
899-900 (8th Cir. 1996). In Buttram, the court enlisted the common law of trusts as a guide to
application of a stricter scrutiny and found the following to be "external factors": 1) where the
administrator labors under a conflict of interest; 2) where the administrator acts dishonestly; 3) where
the administrator acts under an improper motive; and 4) where the administrator fails to use judgment
in reaching a decision. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SacoND) OF TRUSTS § 174 cmt. d, f, g, h (1959).
393. See Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1998) (adding "a palpable conflict
of interest" to the Buttram test); see also Buttram, 76 F.3d at 900 (citing Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co.,
45 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding the traditional abuse of discretion standard applies
unless the affected beneficiary comes forward with evidence indicating that the conflicting interest
caused the administrator to breach its fiduciary duty to the beneficiary)). The court in Buttram further
noted that absent material, probative evidence, beyond a mere irregularity, tending to show that the
administrator breached its fiduciary obligation, the court will apply the traditional abuse of discretion
analysis to discretionary administrator's decisions. Buttram, 76 F.3d at 900 (citing Cuddington v.
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (NIPSCO), 33 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring plaintiff to present
specific evidence of a conflict of interest)).
394. See Woo, 144 F.3d 1157 (citing Buttram, 76 F.3d at 901 (holding that existence of a pro-
cedural irregularity alone will not trigger the heightened standard; rather, the irregularities must have
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The analysis surrounding an administrator's conflict of interest has
experienced an inconsistent evolution in the Eighth Circuit. In Jader v.
Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co.,395 the district court recognized that
the arbitrary and capricious standard is not rigid when an administrator
is operating under a conflict of interest. 396 The standard, however, may
be applied more penetratingly if there is a suspicion that the administra-
tor lacks partiality, but less penetratingly if there is a smaller suspicion of
the administrator's partiality. 397 The Jader court found that the admin-
istrator had a strong conflict of interest because it operated both as the
administrator of the plan and as the insurer responsible for paying the
claims. 398 Therefore, the administrator's decision was arbitrary and
capricious. 399 Thus, at this juncture, it appeared the Eighth Circuit would
perhaps lean toward utilizing the sliding scale analysis.
400
In Whiteside v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,40 however, the dis-
trict court appeared to slide towards the presumptively void analysis.
402
Since the court in Whiteside determined that the administrator's interpre-
tation of the plan was not wrong, however, it was unnecessary to invoke
the burden-shifting component of the presumptively void test. 403 In the
Eighth Circuit decision of Armstrong v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,404 the
court recognized both the sliding scale and the presumptively void
analysis.4 05 Indicating that it was informed by the Eleventh Circuit's
presumptively void test, the court ultimately applied the de novo stan-
some connection to the substantive decision reached)).
395. 723 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (D. Minn. 1989).
396. See Jader v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (D. Minn. 1989) (quoting
Lowry v. Bankers Life and Cas. Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 525 n.6 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 852 (1989)). Cf. Farley v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 147 F.3d 774, 776 (8th Cir.
1998) (finding that not every allegation of impartiality alters the standard of review).
397. See Jader, 723 F. Supp. at 1341 (stating that in conflict of interest situations the arbitrary and
capricious standard may be "more penetrating, the greater is the suspicion of partiality, less penetrat-
ing, the small the suspicion is").
398. See id. at 1342 (remanding the case for consideration as to the administrator's conflict of
interest and lack of diligence in evaluating the claim).
399. See id.
400. See id.
401. 798 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Minn. 1992).
402. See Whiteside v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 798 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 n.1 I (D. Minn. 1992).
In evaluating a conflict of interest, the court found the holding in Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of Alabama, Inc., instructive. See id. (citing Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898
F.2d 1556 (1 lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). As previously noted, the Eleventh
Circuit's presumptively void analysis utilizes a burden-shifting approach. See Brown, 898 F.2d at
1566-67.
403. See Whiteside, 798 F. Supp. at 1387 n.l 1.
404. 128 F.3d 1263 (8th Cir. 1997).
405. See Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1997). The court
acknowledged previous decisions addressing the variation of the abuse of discretion analysis where
"procedural irregularity" is an issue, but it disregarded those decisions' application of a heightened
arbitrary and capricious standard. See id. at 1265 n.I.
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dard of review.406 The court explained its use of the de novo standard
by finding that the administrator was in "perpetual conflict" because it
acted in a dual capacity as both the plan administrator and insurer,
thereby warranting a higher level of scrutiny. 407 The court held that the
administrator, as insurer, had an obvious interest in minimizing its claim
payments and failed to act "solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries," as required by ERISA.408 Therefore, the administrator's
decision was allowed no deference by the Armstrong court.4 09 The avoid-
ed, perpetual conflict of interest question was finally resolved by the
Eighth Circuit in Woo v. Deluxe Corp.410
B. Woo v. DELUXE CORPORATION
Woo involved a denial of disability benefits by Deluxe Corporation
(Deluxe) and Hartford Life Insurance Company (Hartford).411 Beverly
Woo worked for Deluxe from February 1978 through November 1993,
when she resigned from her position.4 2 Unbeknownst to Deluxe, Woo
had been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 1980; it had remained
stable during the course of her employment and had not interfered with
her activities. 413 In the summer of 1993, Woo began experiencing medi-
cal problems, unrelated to her multiple sclerosis, which made her work
duties increasingly difficult to complete.4 14 As a result, Woo's work
performance progressively deteriorated. 415
406. See id. at 1265.
407. See id. (citing Brown, 898 F.2d at 1561).
408. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994)).
409. See id. Importantly, Justice Beam dissented, stating that based on the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Firestone, it was difficult, if not impossible, to apply any standard other than the sliding scale
analysis. See id. at 1267 (Beam, J., dissenting); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 115 (1989). The court in Layes v. Mead Corp. successfully avoided addressing the Arm-
strong de novo review on the grounds that it involved only a question of procedural irregularities, not
conflict of interest. Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1250 n.8 (8th Cir. 1998); see Armstrong, 128
F.3d at 1265. This avoidance was accomplished by holding that since the plaintiff did not raise the
issue of a conflict of interest when the administrator was both the administrator and insurer, the court
did not need to resolve the question. See Layes, 132 F.3d at 1250 n.8.
410. 144 F.3d 1157 (8th Cir. 1998).
411. See Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1998). Both Hartford and Deluxe
were parties to the litigation because Deluxe sponsored and funded the long-term disability plan during
the first two years of qualified disability and Hartford insured the plan for the subsequent period of
disability. See id. at 1161.
412. See id. at 1160. Woo indicated in her exit questionnaire that she did not consider her resig-
nation a voluntary separation. See id. However, the plan manager who conducted the exit interview
indicated in his notes that Woo was leaving to "pursue other opportunities." See id.
413. See id. at 1159. Woo never informed Deluxe of her multiple sclerosis because she did not
want her abilities questioned. See id. In fact, Woo kept her condition a secret from many close
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On February 15, 1994, three months following her resignation, Woo
was diagnosed with scleroderma in addition to the multiple sclerosis. 416
Woo's treating physicians found that she had been disabled as early as
the summer of 1993, prior to her November 1993 resignation.417 Due to
this determination of disability, Woo applied for Social Security Disabili-
ty benefits and benefits under the Deluxe Group Long-Term Disability
Plan, an ERISA welfare benefit plan. 418 Woo's application for long-term
disability was received in March 1995, more than one year following her
resignation. 4 19 Woo's application for social security benefits was ap-
proved, but Hartford denied her application for long-term benefits based
on its independent assessment and conclusion that Woo was not disabled
when she resigned from Deluxe.420
The Woo court determined that Hartford had failed to use proper
judgment in denying Woo's disability benefits and had been acting
under a conflict of interest. 421 In determining the proper standard of re-
view, the court determined that the disability plan language afforded
Hartford discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits. 422
Thus, the baseline standard was arbitrary and capricious. 423 Woo assert-
ed, however, that Hartford's decision to deny benefits should not be
reviewed under the traditional arbitrary and capricious standard because
of procedural irregularities and Hartford's conflict of interest.424 The
court concluded that in order for Woo to trigger a less deferential review,
she must present material, probative evidence demonstrating that 1) a
416. See id. at 1160.
417. See id. After reviewing Dr. Mullin's medical records, Woo's treating neurologist, Dr.
Schapiro, also opined that she was disabled from the combination of the scleroderma and multiple
sclerosis in September of 1993. See id.
418. See id.
419. See Brief of Appellees Deluxe Corporation & Deluxe Group Long Term Disability Benefit
Plan at 5, Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157 (8th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-2055).
420. See Woo, 144 F.3d at 1160.
421. See id. at 1162. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of benefits and remanded it to the
district court with directions to enter judgment awarding Woo long-term disability benefits. See id.
422. See id. at 1160. This determination was reached as Woo did not dispute the granting of
discretion to Hartford. See id.
423. See id.
424. See id. The procedural irregularity discussed by the court was Hartford's failure to employ
a scleroderma expert to review Woo's claim considering it is an uncommon disease. See id. (citing
Hightshue v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir. 1998)). In Hightshue, the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated that when it is possible to question a fiduciary's loyalty, it is obligated, at a minimum, to
conduct an independent scrupulous and intensive investigation of the possible options to insure it acts in
the best interests of the plan beneficiaries. Hightshue, 135 F.3d at 1148. The Hightshue court deter-
mined that seeking the advice of an independent expert was evidence of a thorough investigation, and
if the fiduciary made sure the expert was qualified, provided the expert with complete and accurate
information, and determined that it could reasonably rely on the expert's advice under the circum-
stances, the fiduciary's decision would be upheld, irrespective of the conflict of interest. See id.
(citing Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1237 (1997)).
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palpable conflict of interest or serious procedural irregularity existed
that 2) caused a serious breach of Hartford's fiduciary duty to her. 425
To satisfy the second step of this test, the court indicated that Woo had to
show only that the conflict or procedural irregularity had some connec-
tion to the ultimate substantive decision.426
In considering this test, the Woo court held that Hartford had a
financial conflict because it would be responsible for paying all subse-
quent disability benefits following the initial two years of benefits. 427 As
a result, Hartford received a direct financial benefit as the plan insurer in
denying Woo's disability benefits. 428 Based on the financial benefit that
Hartford would receive, along with its failure to seek an independent
medical evaluation of Woo, the court held that Woo had shown a suffi-
cient connection between Hartford's financial conflict and the denial of
benefits to trigger a less deferential standard of review. 429
The Woo court also found that Hartford reached its decision without
reflection and that it failed to use proper judgment or thoroughly investi-
gate Woo's claim because it merely had an in-house medical consultant
review the claim rather than having a scleroderma expert review her
medical records and conduct an independent medical evaluation. 430 The
court concluded these facts constituted a serious procedural irregularity
that had a sufficient connection to the administrator's decision to trigger
a less deferential review.431
Recognizing that a conflict of interest should be weighed as a factor
in deciding whether an administrator acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
its denial of benefits, the Woo court considered both the sliding scale and
presumptively void tests. 432 The court adopted the sliding scale ap-
425. See Woo, 144 F.3d at 1160. This test is a modification of the test derived from Buttram v.
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund. Buttram v. Central States,
S.E. and S.W. Areas Health and Welfare Fund, 76 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 1996). The Buttram test is
identical, with the exception of the added words "a palpable conflict of interest." Id.
426. See Woo, 144 F.3d at 1161.
427. See id.
428. See id. While the court noted that not every funding conflict of interest alone warrants
heightened review, it implied that the insurer must take a positive step to limit the conflict, such as
controlling a potential underwriting loss with a retrospective premium, thereby decreasing the impact
of a financial conflict. See id. at 1161 n.2.
429. See id. at 1161.
430. See id. ; see also Hightshue v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir. 1998) (seek-
ing independent expect advice is evidence of a thorough investigation if the fiduciary has followed the
criteria listed by the court); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. h (1959) (stating the court
will interpose if the trustee, without knowledge or inquiring into the relevant circumstances and merely
as a result of its arbitrary decision, falls to exercise judgment).
431. See Woo, 144 F.3d at 1161 (citing Buttram, 76 F.3d at 901).
432. See id. (quoting Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)); see also
Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825-27 (10th Cir. 1996) (utilizing the sliding
scale analysis); Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566-67 (1 1th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991) (adopting the presumptively void approach).
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proach, reasoning that it more closely comports with the Supreme
Court's Firestone decision because it requires courts to apply the abuse
of discretion rationale while still considering the conflict or procedural
irregularity when evaluating an administrator's discretionary decision.4 33
The court indicated that the arbitrary and capricious standard is inherent-
ly flexible, allowing courts to make adjustments according to the cir-
cumstances.434 Additionally, the Woo court wrote that the sliding scale
analysis more closely followed its decision in Armstrong v. Aetna Life
Insurance Co., 4 3 5 because egregious circumstances allow the courts
latitude to give no deference to the administrator's decision. 436
Upon adopting the sliding scale test, the Woo court applied it to
Hartford's decision and found that it failed to use proper judgment
which, combined with its financial conflict, amounted to egregious
conduct. 437 The court therefore applied a standard that required the ad-
ministrator's decision to be supported by substantial evidence bordering
on a preponderance. 438 Although not specifically stated, the court es-
sentially extended little to no deference to Hartford's decision to deny
Woo's long-term disability benefits.439 The court based this finding on
the fact that under the sliding scale analysis, the evidence supporting the
administrator's decision must increase in proportion to the seriousness
of the conflict or procedural irregularity. 440
Since Woo did not submit her application for disability benefits
while still employed by Deluxe, Hartford had no opportunity to conduct
a medical evaluation of Woo during the insured period. 441 As a result,
Hartford based its decision on the information available to the adminis-
trator at the time of determining claim eligibility.442 Following a review
of the evidence, the court determined it was insufficient to support Hart-
ford's conclusion that Woo was not disabled when she resigned from
Deluxe. 443
433. See Woo, 144 F.3d at 1161; see also Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
434. See Woo, 144 F.3d at 1161 (citing Chambers, 100 F.3d at 827).
435. 128 F.3d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1997).
436. See Woo, 144 F.3d at 1161-62.
437. See id. at 1162.
438. See id.
439. See id.
440. See id. (citing Ellis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997)).
441. See id.
442. See id. The available information included Woo's claim form, medical records, opinions of
her physicians, her resignation papers, the opinion of Hartford's in-house medical consultant, and




The court dismissed all of Hartford's reasons supporting its denial
of Woo's disability application. 444 The court was not persuaded by Hart-
ford's argument that Woo failed to mention her condition as the reason
for leaving her employment with Deluxe since Woo had never previously
disclosed her health problems. 445 Additionally, it was unavailing for
Hartford to assert that Woo's treating physicians never determined that
she was disabled prior to leaving Deluxe, because Woo had never asked
for a disability rating during her employment with Deluxe.446 The court
relied heavily on the opinions of Woo's treating physicians and Hart-
ford's failure to have either Woo herself or her medical records reviewed
by a scleroderma expert.4 47 Accordingly, the court found insufficient
evidence to support Hartford's determination that Woo was not disabled
when she left Deluxe, and the court awarded Woo long term disability
benefits.448
Thus, the court ruled that Hartford's decision to deny Woo's dis-
ability benefits was arbitrary and capricious.449 Hartford's financial
interest in denying Woo's disability benefits triggered a modified abuse
of discretion standard of review.450 The court determined that Hart-
ford's administration of Woo's claim was egregious. 45 1 As a result,
Hartford's decision was essentially given no deference, although this was
not directly acknowledged by the court. 452 Therefore, a finding that the
plan administrator's conduct was egregious in denial of a beneficiary's
benefits allows the courts within the Eighth Circuit to apply a de novo
standard of review when the plan affords the administrator discretionary
authority but is operating under a conflict of interest. 453
V. CONCLUSION
As illustrated by the above discussions regarding the extreme
division among the circuits in analyzing an ERISA conflict of interest
444. See id.
445. See id.
446. See id. The court noted that the retrospective disability determinations made by Woo's physi-
cians further diluted this basis. See id. The court relied on the holding in Dodson v. Woodmen of the
World Life Ins. Soc'y that more deference is given to the opinion of a person's treating physician. See
id. (citing Dodson v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 109 F.3d 436, 439 (8th Cir. 1997)).
447. See id. (citing Gunderson v. W.R. Grace & Co. Long Term Disability Income Plan, 874 F.2d
496, 499 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding there was not substantial evidence to support the administrator's
denial of benefits because it terminated benefits prior to obtaining a vocational expert's opinion
concerning the plaintiff's capabilities)).
448. See id.
449. See id. at 1163.
450. See id. at 1161.
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situation, this highly litigated area is in desperate need of Supreme Court
guidance. This is evidenced by the many different approaches to a
conflict of interest situation, even among circuits theoretically applying
the same test.454 This sheer lack of consistency results in a wide range
and degree of decisions leaving parties in ERISA actions to speculate
about the possible outcome.455 Obviously, it is necessary to establish
some degree of continuity throughout the circuits to achieve Congress'
expressed purpose of uniformity in ERISA actions.
4 56
Significantly, reviewing a denial of benefits under a de novo stan-
dard of review when the plan grants the administrator discretionary
authority is contrary to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Firestone.457 It is this writer's opinion that careful review of the Fire-
stone decision indicates that the Supreme Court intended the expressed
standards of review to be applied in the designated circumstances "re-
gardless of whether the administrator or fiduciary is operating under a
possible or actual conflict of interest." 458 It follows that the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review is the appropriate standard when
reviewing decisions by a plan administrator who is granted discretionary
authority by the plan, and the standard should not be modified to de
454. Compare Ellis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating even
if the administrator is found to be acting under a conflict of interest, the court will not, under any
circumstances, deviate from the abuse of discretion standard), with Woo, 144 F.3d at 1162 (holding
where the administrator's actions are found to be egregious, its decision is given no deference; in
other words, it is reviewed under a de novo standard even in situations where the plan grants the
administrator discretionary authority).
455. Compare Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d
1014, 1020 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 372 (1998) (finding the mere fact that the administrator
receives a financial gain in denying a claim does not automatically infer a conflict of interest), with
Brown v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc. 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (1 1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1040 (1991) (holding an inherent conflict of interest exists where the source of funding of the
plan also serves as the administrator and claims are paid directly from the funding source's assets).
456. See ERISA, H.R. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4650.
457. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114-15 (1989). The opinion
states in relevant part, "[A] denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(l)(B) is to be reviewed
under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Firestone, 489 U.S. at 114-15.
Further, "[I]f a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under
conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a 'facto[r] in determining whether there is an
abuse of discretion." Id. (emphasis added).
458. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. This is supported by the Supreme Court's statement following its
determination of the appropriate standards of review: "(B]ecause we do not rest our decision
[regarding the applicable standards of review in an ERISA action] on the concern for impartiality...
we need not distinguish between types of plans or focus on the motivation of plan administrators and
fiduciaries." Id. Further, although the Supreme Court adopted the standards of review upon reflection
of trust law, the language of the opinion indicates that the Supreme Court did not intend the standard of
review to advance to de novo from arbitrary and capricious if the plan grants the administrator
discretionary authority. See id.
[VOL. 75:815868
1999]
novo. 459 Accordingly, the circuits that have adopted the traditional slid-
ing scale analysis that does not deviate from the arbitrary and capricious
standard, regardless of the degree of the administrator's conflict, more
accurately reflect the Supreme Court's intent in Firestone.460 While the
decision in Woo purports to have adopted the sliding scale analysis, it
essentially allows the courts to give an administrator's decision abso-
lutely no deference if its conduct is determined by the court to be
egregious. 461 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has strayed from congres-
sional intent in its purported adoption of the sliding scale analysis in
Woo.462 Under the guise of a sliding scale analysis, the Eighth Circuit
has modified this test to such an extent that it allows itself to go beyond
the intended arbitrary and capricious standard and apply the de novo
standard.4 63 In summary, the Eighth Circuit decision in Woo further sup-
ports the opinion that the ERISA conflict of interest analysis is a prime






461. See Woo, 144 F.3d at 1162.
462. Id. at 1161.
463. See id. at 1162 (giving the administrator's decision no deference because the court deter-
mined its actions to be egregious).
464. See id.
465. Thank you to George Koeck and Matthew Klein with Dorsey & Whitney, P.L.L.P., for intro-
ducing me to the challenge of ERISA. Special gratitude is extended to my family: Gene, Diane,
Tammy, Rod, Jon, Elaine, and Terry for their continuous support. Finally, to Shawn ... thank you for
your love and encouragement; I could not have done it without you.
869NoTE

